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“[W]hen someone buys a book, they are also buying the right to resell that book, 
to loan it out, or to even give it away if they want. Everyone understands this.” 
— Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you purchase a new book from Amazon. You visit Amazon.com, 
find a book that looks promising, click the familiar Buy Now button, wait a mere 
two days for Amazon Prime delivery, and promptly place that new volume on 
your bookshelf, waiting for the perfect rainy day to crack it open. The next 
morning, you wake up to find a book-sized gap on your shelf. Your book has 
disappeared. Just then, you receive an email from Amazon customer service 
explaining that—at the copyright holder’s request—the book has been recalled. 
Amazon informs you that it dispatched a drone to your home to silently 
and carefully retrieve the book while you slept in order to avoid any 
inconvenience. But not to worry, Amazon reassures you, your account has 
already been credited with a refund. 
Most consumers would be outraged at such an intrusion, not only because 
of the physical violation it entails, but also because it contravenes some basic 
assumptions about the nature of personal property rights. When we buy a 
book, we own it; it is our property. And one right traditionally associated with 
personal property is the ability to keep the things you own for as long as you 
 
1 Tim O’Reilly, Jeff Bezos’ Open Letter on Used Book Sales, O’REILLY COMMUNITY (Apr. 15, 
2002, 11:17 AM), http://archive.oreilly.com/pub/wlg/1291 [https://perma.cc/WL58-MGDJ]. Bezos 
offered this defense of the rights of book buyers in response to criticism by the Author’s Guild of 
America regarding Amazon’s prominent marketing of used books on its site. See David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Online Sales of Used Books Draw Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.
com/2002/04/10/business/online-sales-of-used-books-draw-protest.html [https://perma.cc/78FG-X
B32] (reporting on the Authors Guild’s email to its members encouraging them to not “be complicit” 
in “Amazon’s ‘notorious used-book service’”). 
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choose.2 They cannot be taken from you without your consent, certainly not 
by private actors for their own benefit.3 
As unthinkable as this scenario may be, it is almost exactly what happened 
to Amazon Kindle users in 2009.4 In response to disputes with publishers, 
Amazon remotely deleted the locally stored copies of a number of books from 
the devices of consumers.5 The deleted books ranged from those by Ayn Rand 
to Harry Potter.6 But perhaps most tellingly, they included George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four.7 In that dystopian classic, the Ministry of Truth, the 
novel’s fictional government, destroyed documents by tossing them into the 
memory hole, a network of tubes leading to an incinerator.8 Kindle users—
perhaps struck by the irony—went to bed one night thinking they owned a 
copy of Orwell’s cautionary tale only to wake up the next morning to find 
that their books had vanished down a different series of tubes.9 
More prosaically, media companies—even large, reputable ones—have 
sometimes shut down or otherwise deprived consumers access to paid digital 
media. Google, Major League Baseball, MSN Music, Sony, Virgin Digital, 
Walmart, and Yahoo have all shuttered digital media services, or at least 
 
2 See, e.g., A. M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-15 (A.G. 
Guest ed., 1961) (identifying the right of possession as one of eleven incidents of ownership). 
3 Even the state’s considerable power of eminent domain is constrained to takings that serve 
some public purpose. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (explaining that 
“the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another 
private party B”); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (“A purely private taking 
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose 
of government and would thus be void.”). 
4 See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html [https://perma.cc/RZV5-8H
DP] (reporting on Amazon’s forced deletion of George Orwell’s novels from certain Kindle owners’ 
devices). This power to remotely remove or disable purchases is not limited to eReaders like the 
Amazon Kindle. See, e.g., Matt Buchanan, Apple Can Remotely Disable Apps Installed on Your iPhone, 
GIZMODO (Aug. 6, 2008, 6:15 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5034007/apple-can-remotely-disable-apps-install
ed-on-your-phone [https://perma.cc/JW58-DDWV] (reporting on Apple’s ability to remotely disable 
iPhone applications, regardless of user consent); Gregg Keizer, Microsoft: We Can Remotely Delete Windows 
8 Apps, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 8, 2011, 1:57 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2500036/
desktop-apps/microsoft—we-can-remotely-delete-windows-8-apps.html [https://perma.cc/QCX7-9XTD] 
(describing Microsoft’s ability to disable or eliminate applications from users’ Windows 8 devices). 
5 See Stone, supra note 4 (reporting on Amazon’s remote deletion of e-books off of users’ Kindles). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
9 Senator Ted Stevens was mocked for describing the Internet as a “series of tubes” in 2006, 
but this analogy is not far off the mark. See Michael J. Socolow, Ted Stevens Wins: The Internet’s Tubes 
Will Be Unclogged, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2014, 10:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/01
/15/net_neutrality_struck_down_in_a_victory_for_the_late_sen_ted_stevens.html [https://perma.cc/FL
N8-LTMK] (noting that the late Senator Ted Stevens’s “‘tubes’ speech remains infamous”). But see 
ANDREW BLUM, TUBES: A JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE INTERNET 5 (2012) (describing 
the interconnectedness of the Internet as “a series of tubes”). 
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threatened to do so.10 Recently, NOOK announced the shutdown of its service 
in the UK, while assuring purchasers that they should “have continued access 
to the vast majority of [their] purchased NOOK Books at no new cost.”11 As we 
explain more fully below, the switch to a digital platform offers convenience, but 
it also makes consumer access more contingent. Unlike a purchase at a bookstore, 
a digital media transaction is continuous, linking buyer and seller, and giving the 
seller post-transaction power that would be impossible in physical markets. 
Permanent possession is not the only right traditionally associated with 
ownership that is at stake in the digital environment. In 2012, reports spread 
across the Internet that movie star Bruce Willis planned to file a lawsuit 
against Apple over restrictions in the iTunes Terms of Service that prevented 
him from leaving his digital music collection to his daughters in the event of 
his death.12 Although the story turned out to be a hoax,13 the worries about 
what happens to our digital libraries when we die are decidedly real. 
The terms of use and end user license agreements (EULAs) associated 
with digital media goods typically restrict not only bequeathing those goods 
by will, but all manner of transfers. According to those provisions, purchasers 
cannot lend media goods; they cannot give them away as gifts; and they 
certainly cannot resell them.14 For tangible goods like books, records, and movies, 
 
10 See Matt Buchanan, Five Stores That Hosed Customers with DRM, GIZMODO (Apr. 28, 2008, 
12:15 PM), http://gizmodo.com/384741/five-stores-that-hosed-customers-with-drm [https://perma.cc/
RLX8-LKJ2] (reporting on the cessation of digital media services by Major League Baseball, Google, 
Sony, Virgin Digital, and Microsoft); Antone Gonsalves, Wal-Mart Reverses Decision to Shutdown 
Digital Music DRM Servers, INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 10, 2008, 5:41 PM), http://www.informationweek.
com/wal-mart-reverses-decision-to-shutdown-digital-music-drm-servers-/d/d-id/1072848 [https://perma.
cc/N4U6-UFUT] (describing Wal-Mart’s reversal of its decision to shut down its digital music servers 
due to negative customer feedback); Jon Healey, Yahoo Pulls an MSN Music (Only Faster), L.A. TIMES: 
BIT PLAYER (July 23, 2008), http://opinion.latimes.com/bitplayer/2008/07/yahoo-pull-and.html [https://
perma.cc/82QJ-UBKN] (describing how customers were unable to access their online music after Yahoo 
shut down its digital media service); see also Julie Jacobson, Perils of DRM: What Happens to Your Digital 
Content if the Provider Goes Out of Business?, CE PRO (June 5, 2009), http://www.cepro.com/article
/print/what_happens_to_your_digital_content_if_the_provider_goes_out_of_business/ [https://perma.cc
/6W3E-RDNV] (reporting on issues that companies and consumers have had using digital rights 
management (DRM) protection). 
11 Notice, The NOOK Team, Important Changes to the NOOK Service, http://www.nook.com
/gb/notice [https://perma.cc/ZM3W-MSLT] (emphasis added). 
12 E.g., John Harlow & Robin Henry, It’s iHard as Willis Fights Apple, SUNDAY TIMES (Sept. 2, 
2012), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Tech/article1117103.ece [https://perma.cc/FJ8
7-QH7A] (reporting on Bruce Willis’s desire to establish a trust in order to leave his digital music 
collection to his daughters). 
13 See Charles Arthur, No, Bruce Willis Isn’t Suing Apple over iTunes Rights, GUARDIAN: APPLE 
TECH. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2012/sep/03/
no-apple-bruce-willis [https://perma.cc/J7ET-DFPR] (refuting the claim that Bruce Willis planned 
to sue Apple over ownership of his music collection). 
14 For example, Amazon’s terms for Kindle ebooks include the following provision, “Unless 
specifically indicated otherwise, you may not sell, rent, lease, distribute, broadcast, sublicense, or 
otherwise assign any rights to the Kindle Content . . . .” Kindle Store Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://
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copyright law’s first sale doctrine guarantees owners the right to transfer them as 
they see fit.15 But copyright holders and digital retailers argue that digital goods 
are different for two reasons. First, transfer of a digital file typically requires the 
creation of a new copy.16 Second, rights holders and retailers maintain that digital 
media goods are not sold to purchasers; they are merely licensed.17 
 
www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201014950 [https://perma.cc/FA55-C7T4] (last 
updated Mar. 15, 2016). Similarly, Amazon’s MP3 store terms state that “you may not redistribute, 
transmit, assign, sell, broadcast, rent, share, lend, modify, adapt, edit, license or otherwise transfer or 
use Purchased Music.” Amazon Music Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer
/display.html?nodeId=201380010 [https://perma.cc/HW7P-KFEH] (last updated Apr. 12, 2016). Apple’s 
App Store terms provide, “You may not transfer, redistribute or sublicense the Licensed Application 
and, if you sell your Apple Device to a third party, you must remove the Licensed Application from 
the Apple Device before doing so . . . . You agree not to modify, rent, loan, sell, or distribute the 
Services or Content in any manner, and you shall not exploit the Services in any manner not expressly 
authorized.” Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/itunes/us/terms.html [https://perma.cc/66BZ-42L3] (last updated Sept. 13, 2016). 
15 See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made 
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”); see 
also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (describing the first sale rule 
as “a common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree”). The statutory first sale rule 
imposes some restrictions on the commercial rental, leasing, and lending of copies of sound 
recordings and computer programs. See id. § 109(b) (describing the circumstances in which the 
renting, leasing, and lending of certain media are restricted, such as for the purpose of direct or 
indirect commercial advantage). 
16 See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 901 (2011) 
(noting how “the benefits of first sale have traditionally depended on a single trigger: ownership of a 
copy of a work”). 
17 See, e.g., Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 14 (“Kindle Content is licensed, not sold, to you 
by the Content Provider.”); Terms of Service and User Agreement, SONY PLAYSTATION NETWORK, 
https://www.playstation.com/en-us/network/legal/terms-of-service/ [https://perma.cc/PDV9-DYVV] (“[A]ll 
content and software . . . are licensed non-exclusively and revocably to you . . . solely for Your 
personal, private, non-transferable, non-commercial, limited use on a limited number of Authorized 
Devices in the country in which your account is registered . . . . You may not sell, rent, lease, loan, 
sublicense, modify, adapt, arrange, translate, reverse engineer, decompile, or disassemble any portion 
of the Property.”). Apple is somewhat less clear in how it characterizes iTunes transactions. After 
informing consumers that its “[s]tandard EULA will govern any content . . . purchased” and noting 
that “[a]ll [t]ransactions are final,” Apple insists that consumers agree not to “modify, rent, loan, sell, 
or distribute” their purchases. Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14; see also 
Amazon Music Terms of Use, supra note 14 (“[A]ll sales are final and risk of loss transfers upon sale.”). 
The choice to avoid the “licensed, not sold” language in the music context is presumably a function 
of recording contracts that entitle artists to significantly higher royalty rates for licenses in 
comparison to royalties on sales. See F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 964-
65 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the differences between [a license and a sale] play an important role 
in the overall structure and policies that govern artistic rights”); Eriq Gardner, Universal Music 
Settling Big Class Action Lawsuit over Digital Royalties (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 19, 2015, 
1:51 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/universal-music-settling-big-class-783096 [https://
perma.cc/64MB-XAAF] (reporting that artists receive fifteen percent of download income based on 
“sales” versus fifty percent for “licenses”). 
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While lawyers might comprehend the difference between a license and a 
traditional sale, there are good reasons to doubt that the average consumer 
appreciates this distinction. The overwhelming majority of online shoppers 
ignore license terms.18 It is not hard to understand why. Licenses are 
notoriously long and complex. Although Apple has recently trimmed them 
down, the iTunes Terms and Conditions were once over 19,000 words—longer 
than Shakespeare’s Macbeth.19 And these licenses are overflowing with defined 
terms, technical jargon, legalese, and complex sentence structures.20 Given their 
complexity and ubiquity, it is only a slight exaggeration to claim that if consumers 
were to read every license agreement they encountered, the economy would grind 
to a halt.21 So it is no surprise that most people—including the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court22—choose to ignore licenses, particularly when making a 
ninety-nine cent purchase from iTunes or Amazon.23 
 
18 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations 
of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 179-81 (2011) (reporting 
empirical data supporting the conclusion that license terms “are almost always ignored”); see also 
Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts 22 
(N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 195, 2013), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1199&context=nyu_lewp [https://perma.cc/DDP2-R6UZ] (finding that license agreements for 
software retailers were accessed by users only 0.05% of the time). Our own results show a slightly higher 
rate of 1.4%. See infra text accompanying note 75. The common distinction between licenses and sales 
ignores the fact that a license to make use of a work may be accompanied by a sale, lease, or other transfer 
of a copy of that work. See Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmet, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License: 
Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European Community, 36 U. S.F. 
L. REV. 1, 11 (2001) (discussing “critical” distinctions between “carrier media and protected intellectual 
property” as well as “the intellectual property itself . . . and the right to use or copy” that material). 
19 Tom Gardner, To Read, or Not to Read . . . the Terms and Conditions, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 22, 
2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2118688/PayPal-agreement-longer-Hamlet-
iTunes-beats-Macbeth.html [https://perma.cc/FV5F-RZ83]. 
20 Indeed, many licenses require a postgraduate education to fully understand. See DOUGLAS E. 
PHILLIPS, THE SOFTWARE LICENSE UNVEILED: HOW LEGISLATION BY LICENSE CONTROLS SOFTWARE 
ACCESS 77 (2009) (using the Flesch-Kincaid readability formula to analyze an Adobe licensing agreement 
and finding that a reader would likely need at least 19.3 years of formal education in order to decipher it). 
21 To take a single example, Adobe Flash is a software platform that is downloaded 
approximately eight million times each day. See Bob Dormon, Adobe Demands 7,000 Years a Day from 
Humankind, REGISTER (Dec. 4, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/12/04/feature_
tech_licences_are_daft [https://perma.cc/PKJ2-C9DS] (noting the software company’s reported daily 
downloads). Assuming the average user can read the software’s 3500-word license in ten minutes, if 
everyone who installed Flash in a single day read the license, it would require collectively over 1500 
years of human attention per day. Id. 
22 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine Print, 
A.B.A. J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 12:17 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_
admits_he_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print/ [https://perma.cc/WKL4-2KR4] (“Answering a 
student question, Roberts admitted he doesn’t usually read the computer jargon that is a condition 
of accessing websites . . . .”). 
23 Because licenses create idiosyncratic bundles of rights, a consumer would have to investigate 
the details of each transaction in order to be informed of the material differences between them. As 
a result, licenses impose significant information costs on consumers. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 
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If they do not read the terms, how well do consumers understand the 
choices they are making when they choose ebooks over hardcovers, MP3s over 
CDs and vinyl, or movie downloads over Blu-ray discs? Perhaps consumers 
think that the terms do not contain important limits, or that the convenience 
of immediate gratification outweighs any limits imposed. Most consumers are 
operating on the basis of incomplete information. Moreover, they may wrongly 
assume that the unread, and thus, unknown terms in license agreements are 
more favorable than they are in fact. Recent work by Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz 
suggests that many consumers suffer from “term optimism”—the tendency to 
“expect a contract to contain more favorable terms than it actually provides.”24 
For example, consumers might anticipate that unread terms allow them to lend 
their ebooks to friends and family. Beyond this baseline optimism bias, the 
likelihood that consumers will act on the basis of the mistaken belief that license 
terms grant them greater rights than they actually do might be exacerbated by 
marketing language that sends a signal inconsistent with the fine print. 
Some commentators have expressed concern that consumers might be 
misled by the apparent disconnect between the message communicated by 
the Buy Now button and the limited set of rights contemplated by EULAs 
and terms of service.25 If so, the apparent embrace of digital goods may not 
accurately reflect consumer preferences. But industry representatives have 
been more sanguine, insisting that consumers have a more nuanced and 
sophisticated understanding of these transactions.26 
 
YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (“[T]here is a potentially infinite range of promises that the law will honor.”); 
see also Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REV. 
235, 248 (2013) (discussing how “[e]very in rem right imposes information costs on a large and 
indefinite class of people”). 
24 See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 545, 551 (2014). 
25 See DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, 
FIRST SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES 56-57 (2016) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES], 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV9Y-
W6JQ] (noting commentators’ concern that “consumers expect that when they click on the [Buy Now] 
button, they will ‘own’ the copy”); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal 
Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1257 (2015) (noting the potential for consumer misunderstanding 
as a result of the Buy Now button). 
26  See WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, supra note 25, at 56 n.352 (quoting Ben Sheffner of the 
Motion Picture Association of America as stating, “If you ask people when you go to a site to buy a 
movie or a book or a song, I think they pretty much understand that you’re not actually buying the 
copyright. What you are doing is you’re purchasing or buying a license which permits you to do certain 
things” and K. Christopher Branch of KC Branch Firm as stating, “I’m not sure that the consumers 
have the expectation that when they hit the buy button for some music that they’re thinking about how 
they’re going to resell it . . . .”); see also DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, GREEN 
PAPER ROUNDTABLE ON COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY 156 (2014), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/global/copyrights/la_transcript.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EG9A-H7BE] (quoting Catherine Bridge of Disney as stating, “I haven’t done a 
survey[.] I can’t speak scientifically about this, but . . . I would just say that I don’t think use of the buy 
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In its recent White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and Statutory Damages, the 
Department of Commerce noted that the “the record before [it] [wa]s devoid 
of any actual evidence as to what consumers understand when they click on 
the ‘buy’ button.”27 Nonetheless, it expressed concern over consumers’ 
understanding of their ownership rights in the online context: 
It does not appear that consumers have a clear understanding whether they own 
or license the products and services they purchase online due in part to the length 
and opacity of most EULAs, the labelling of the “buy” button, and the lack of 
clear and conspicuous information regarding ownership status on websites.28 
Why might consumers be misled? Consumers operate in the marketplace 
based on their prior experience.29 We suggest that consumers’ “default” 
behavior is based on the experience of buying physical media and that the 
assumptions from that context have carried over into the digital domain. As the 
above quote from Jeff Bezos reminds us, “[e]veryone understands” that when 
they buy a book, record, or movie, they can resell it, lend it, or give it away.30 
And the familiar Buy Now button leverages that common understanding. 
This Article presents the results of the first study of the impact of 
marketing language like the Buy Now button on the beliefs and behavior of 
digital media consumers. Our data demonstrate that a sizable percentage of 
consumers is misled with respect to the rights they acquire when they “buy” 
digital media goods. They mistakenly believe they can keep those goods 
permanently, lend them to friends and family, give them as gifts, leave them 
in their wills, resell them, and use them on their devices of choice. 
Not only are consumers misled, they are misled about ownership rights 
that are important to them. A sizable percentage of consumers express a 
desire for those rights and many say they are willing to pay more to preserve 
them. Importantly for retailers and copyright holders, respondents in our 
study indicated that they would turn to streaming services and BitTorrent if 
they were unable to engage in the uses typically associated with personal 
property ownership. 
Part I of this Article describes the current digital media marketplace. Part II 
describes the methods of our study. Part III details the results and offers a number 
of hypotheses to explain them. Part IV considers these results through the lens of 
 
button is a deception, and I think . . . that people are consuming content are understanding that it’s not 
a physical ownership model.”). 
27 WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, supra note 25, at 68. 
28 Id. 
29 See Manoj Hastak & Michael Mazis, Deception by Implication: A Typology of Truthful but 
Misleading Advertising and Labeling Claims, J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING, Fall 2011, at 157, 158-59 
(discussing “schema” theory). 
30 O’Reilly, supra note 1. 
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false and deceptive advertising law. The Article concludes by considering the 
implications of the study on other segments of the digital economy. 
I. THE DIGITAL MEDIA MARKETPLACE 
The market for media goods has undergone rapid and significant changes 
in recent years. For decades, if not centuries, copyright holders monetized their 
works primarily through the sale of tangible copies—hardcover books, CDs, 
records, sheet music, Blu-ray movies, DVDs, and, before that, VHS tapes. But 
the emergence of the Internet, coupled with mobile computing technology, led 
to a rethinking of media distribution. Pressing plants, delivery trucks, and shelf 
space have largely been replaced by servers, data plans, and disk space. This 
shift has dramatically affected the relationship between consumers and the media 
goods they acquire. At the same time, it has introduced considerable ambiguity 
about the nature of the transactions that make up the digital marketplace. 
A. From Physical to Digital 
In the wake of Napster,31 the music industry felt pressure to establish some 
means for lawful access to digital music. After a couple of failed attempts by 
the industry,32 Apple launched the iTunes Music Store in 2003.33 Within a 
decade, iTunes boasted a library of forty-three million tracks that had been 
downloaded thirty-five billion times, making Apple the largest music retailer 
in the world—no doubt in part because of Apple’s dominance in the media player 
hardware market.34 Soon paid music downloads surpassed physical media sales. 
A similar trend played itself out in the world of books, with a dominant hardware-
 
31 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Through a 
process commonly called ‘peer-to-peer’ file sharing, Napster allows its users to: (1) make MP3 music 
files stored on individual computer hard drives available for copying by other Napster users; (2) 
search for MP3 music files stored on other users’ computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the 
contents of other users’ MP3 files from one computer to another via the Internet.”). 
32 See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 8-10 (2009) (describing 
the failure of the major label-backed Pressplay and MusicNet services). 
33 See Nathan Ingraham, iTunes Store at 10: How Apple Built a Digital Media Juggernaut, VERGE 
(Apr. 26, 2013, 11:56 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/26/4265172/itunes-store-at-10-how-apple-
built-a-digital-media-juggernaut [https://perma.cc/3MS4-7PPV] (reporting on the tenth anniversary of 
the launch of the iTunes Music Store). 
34 See ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/music [https://perma.cc/9C26-3TZF] (advertising 
that the iTunes store has forty-three million songs for sale); Jordan Kahn, Eddy Cue: Apple Passed 35 
Billions Songs Sold on iTunes Last Week, 40 Million iTunes Radio Listeners, 9TO5MAC (May 28, 
2014), http://9to5mac.com/2014/05/28/eddy-cue-apple-passed-35-billions-songs-sold-on-itunes-last-week
-40-million-itunes-radio-listeners [https://perma.cc/U573-MN8X] (noting that Apple has sold more than 
thirty-five billion songs); see also Press Release, Apple, iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US (Apr. 
3, 2008), https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03iTunes-Store-Top-Music-Retailer-in-the-US.html 
[https://perma.cc/FH7U-LCMH] (announcing that iTunes “became the largest music retailer in the 
US based on the amount of music sold during January and February 2008”). 
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maker driving explosive growth in the sale of digital media. After Amazon 
released the Kindle, annual ebook sales increased from ten million in 2008 to 510 
million in 2014, rivaling sales of physical books.35 Likewise, paid software and 
video game downloads have come to rival or even surpass physical sales.36 
Initially, consumers downloaded their digital purchases and stored copies 
locally. But as smartphones replaced dedicated media playback devices like 
the iPod, and as high speed mobile data networks matured, sellers encouraged 
consumers to store media on the provider’s cloud network.37 Since those files 
may not be stored permanently on a user’s device, continued possession and 
access is less certain.38 The lack of physical possession means that consumers’ 
access to their purchases is contingent on the cloud service provider. Apple, 
for example, has removed purchased albums from consumers’ iTunes cloud 
accounts at the request of copyright holders.39 If the consumer did not save a 
 
35 See Marisa Bluestone, U.S. Publishing Industry’s Annual Survey Reveals $28 Billion in Revenue in 
2014, ASS’N AM. PUB. (June 10, 2015), http://publishers.org/news/us-publishing-industry’s-annual-survey-
reveals-28-billion-revenue-201 [https://perma.cc/4F2W-MQVT] (noting that ebook sales reached 510 
million in 2014); Jim Milliot, BEA 2013: The E-book Boom Years, PUBLISHER’S WKLY. (May 29, 2013), 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bea/article/57390-bea-2013-the-e-book-
boom-years.html [https://perma.cc/99H2-DSVM] (indicating that ebook sales totaled only ten million 
in 2008, the year the Kindle was released). Although sales of ebooks surpassed hardcovers in 2012, 
digital sales decreased for the first time ever in 2015, in part because of publisher-driven price 
increases. See Alexandra Alter, The Plot Twist: E-Book Sales Slip, and Print Is Far From Dead, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/media/the-plot-twist-e-book-sales-slip-and-
print-is-far-from-dead.html [https://perma.cc/TN8B-PBHZ] (noting that the Association of American 
Publishers reported reduced sales of ebooks and suggesting that physical books are uniquely attractive 
to consumers). But see Matthew Ingram, No, E-book Sales Are Not Falling, Despite What Publishers Say, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2015, 1:40 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/24/ebook-sales/ [https://perma.cc/
P35U-J87H] (challenging the conclusion that overall ebooks sales declined, citing the impact of 
higher prices on sales). 
36 See Jacqui Cheng, Forget the Box: Downloads Dominate Online Software Purchases, ARS 
TECHNICA (May 28, 2010, 4:26 PM), http://arstechnica.com/software/news/2010/05/forget-the-box-do
wnloads-dominate-online-software-purchases.ars [https://perma.cc/LB7H-J6UR] (indicating that “nearly 
two-thirds of online software purchases . . . were digital downloads”); Lance Whitney, Digital Game 
Downloads Beat Retail Store Sales, CNET (Sept. 20, 2010, 9:05 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10797
_3-20016943-235.html [https://perma.cc/4UST-MJVF] (noting that digital PC game sales surpassed retail 
game sales in 2010). 
37 The “cloud” refers to remote storage, processing, and other computing resources available 
to Internet users. Although marketed as a groundbreaking technology, the cloud has its roots in 
much older, pre-digital networks. See generally TUNG-HUI HU, A PREHISTORY OF THE CLOUD (2015) 
(tracing the history of the cloud to industrial networks such as railroad and sanitation systems). 
38 Even when consumers store copies locally, their ability to use them as they choose can be 
constrained by DRM technologies. 
39 For example, if a copyright holder removes an album from the iTunes Store or replaces it 
with a new version of the same album, purchasers are prevented from accessing or downloading the 
removed album. See Geoffrey Goetz, Apple’s iCloud Is No Safe Haven for Some iTunes Purchases, 
GIGAOM (Sept. 25, 2013, 4:10 PM), https://gigaom.com/2013/09/25/apples-icloud-is-no-safe-haven-
for-some-itunes-purchases/ [https://perma.cc/T8W5-CKRH] (recounting how numerous albums 
purchased by the author “disappeared from [his] iTunes Match music library”). 
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local copy, her purchased music simply vanished. Apple’s terms explicitly 
contemplate this scenario: “Apple further reserves the right to modify, 
suspend, or discontinue the Services (or any part or Content thereof) at any 
time with or without notice to you, and Apple will not be liable to you or to 
any third party should it exercise such rights.”40 
In recent years, subscription streaming services have exploded in 
popularity. Netflix and Hulu launched online video services in 2007.41 Today, 
Netflix is one of the most popular content providers on the Internet. The 
service has more than seventy-five million subscribers and accounts for a third 
of all Internet traffic in North America.42 In 2015, its revenue exceeded $6.7 
billion.43 Music streaming services have seen similar growth. Spotify has 
seventy-five million active users, about twenty million of whom are paying 
subscribers.44 In 2014, the use of streaming services grew by a staggering fifty-
four percent.45 Not surprisingly, the streaming subscription model is being 
applied to books, video games, and other media as well.46 
The eagerness of consumers to embrace streaming services makes sense. 
Streaming services are inexpensive, typically costing around ten dollars per 
month. They have massive content libraries,47 while still being convenient, 
 
40 Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14. 
41 See Ken Auletta, Outside the Box: Netflix and the Future of Television, NEW YORKER: ANNALS 
COMMUN. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/03/outside-the-box-2 [https:
//perma.cc/U59H-PYU6] (noting that Netflix began streaming movies and TV in 2007, the same 
year that NBC and Fox launched Hulu). 
42 See Victor Luckerson, Netflix Accounts for More Than a Third of All Internet Traffic, TIME (May 
29, 2015), http://time.com/3901378/netflix-internet-traffic [https://perma.cc/UGU5-X7D2] (“[N]etflix 
now accounts more almost [sic] 37% of downstream Internet traffic in North America during peak evening 
hours . . . .”); Ben Popper, Netflix Whizzes Past 75 Million Subscribers Thanks to Record International 
Growth, VERGE (Jan. 19, 2016, 4:17 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/19/10790282/netflix-q4-2015-
earnings [https://perma.cc/D25P-WJHT] (reporting on the rapid growth in Netflix subscribership). 
43 See Netflix Inc., MARKETWATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/nflx/financials 
[https://perma.cc/M6W7-EX2V] (reporting data on Netflix’s sales, including $6.78 billion in 2015). 
44 See 20 Million Reasons To Say Thanks, SPOTIFY NEWS (June 10, 2015), https://news.spotify.com/
us/2015/06/10/20-million-reasons-to-say-thanks/ [https://perma.cc/L8S4-8Z8E] (announcing these milestones 
in Spotify subscribership). 
45 Ethan Smith, Music Downloads Plummet in U.S., but Sales of Vinyl Records and Streaming Surge, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/music-downloads-plummet-in-u-s-but-sales-
of-vinyl-records-and-streaming-surge-1420092579 [https://perma.cc/WT4U-GJJM]. 
46 In 2014, Amazon launched Kindle Unlimited, which gives subscribers access to a growing ebook 
library for a fixed monthly price. See Hayley Tsukayama, Is Kindle Unlimited Worth It?, WASH. POST (July 
18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/07/18/is-kindle-unlimited-worth-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/T77A-K56Y] (reporting on the launch of the Kindle Unlimited service). Services like 
EA Access offer subscriptions to online video game libraries. See Erik Kain, Sony Was Right To Turn Down 
EA’s Video Game Subscription Plan [Update], FORBES (July 30, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/erikkain/2014/07/30/sony-was-right-to-turn-down-eas-video-game-subscription-plan/ [https://perma.cc/
2RC9-ZZ2Z] (describing the emergence of gaming subscription services, including EA Access). 
47 See Madi Alexander & Ben Sisario, Apple Music, Spotify and a Guide to Music Streaming 
Services, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/30/business/media/
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offering portability and compatibility with a range of devices. From the 
perspective of copyright holders, there are upsides as well. By moving from 
physical to digital distribution, content owners can limit the impact of 
secondary markets. They can also bundle old, low-value content with new, 
high-value titles.48 Subscription streaming services are also viewed as a 
strategy for reducing copyright infringement.49 Given their low price point, 
services like Netflix and Spotify can attract consumers who might otherwise 
get their movies and music from The Pirate Bay.50 
But individual creators have been less than enthusiastic about offering 
their content on subscription services. A parade of songwriters and recording 
artists have complained about what they say are parsimonious royalty rates.51 
Compared to the good old days of record-breaking CD sales, musicians are 
seeing checks that are missing several zeroes. In large part, that is because 
consumers are not willing to pay as much for temporary access to music as 
they are to own copies. The other explanation is that the bulk of the more 
than two billion dollars that Spotify has paid in copyright licenses—a figure 
representing seventy percent of its revenue—went to record labels.52 Under 
 
music-streaming-guide.html [https://perma.cc/SM95-XHTK] (noting that the Spotify, Google Play, 
Tidal, and Apple Music libraries each include more than thirty million tracks); Piotr Kowalczyk, Kindle 
Unlimited Ebook Subscription — 9 Things to Know, EBOOK FRIENDLY, http://ebookfriendly.com/kindle
-unlimited-ebook-subscription/ [https://perma.cc/D5MZ-6GV3] (last updated Oct. 27, 2015) (noting 
that the Kindle Unlimited library includes over a million books); Michael Liedtke, Gaps in Netflix’s 
Online Library Likely to Persist, YAHOO! NEWS (Apr. 9, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/gaps-netflixs-
online-library-likely-persist-200620994.html [https://perma.cc/X4HQ-2GB7] (noting that the Netflix 
streaming library includes over 60,000 movie and television titles). 
48 See Tim Carmody, Netflix-Warner Bros. Deal Bundles Old and New Niche Dramas, VERGE (Jan. 
7, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/7/3846246/netflix-warner-bros-revolution-west-wing 
[https://perma.cc/K8QX-YPF9] (reporting on a Netflix deal with Warner Bros., a continuation of 
Netflix’s strategy of “[b]undling hot and not-so-hot series” in one deal to lower costs). 
49 See James Titcomb, Internet Piracy Falls to Record Lows Amid Ride of Spotify and Netflix, 
TELEGRAPH (July 5, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/07/04/internet-
piracy-falls-to-record-lows-amid-rise-of-spotify-and-ne/ [https://perma.cc/X9EY-T7WE] (noting the 
“strong link between the rise of [subscription] services and falling piracy” suggested by a report 
commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Intellectual Property Office). 
50 See Luis Aguiar & Joel Waldfogel, Streaming Reaches Flood Stage: Does Spotify Stimulate or Depress 
Music Sales? 20 (European Comm’n Joint Research Ctr., Inst. for Prospective Tech. Studies Dig. Econ. 
Working Paper No. 2015/05, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/JRC96951.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PCN4-EJ3G] (analyzing data on “total weekly unpaid consumption on the top-50 weekly 
Spotify streaming index” to show that usage of Spotify displaces music piracy). 
51 See Zach Schonfeld, What Do Indie Musicians Really Think About Music Streaming?, NEWSWEEK 
(July 23, 2015, 8:49 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/ten-indie-musicians-weigh-music-streaming-debate
-355298 [https://perma.cc/Y9UV-3NMD] (identifying a number of artists including Taylor Swift, Thom 
Yorke, and Prince, who have criticized Spotify and other streaming services, while noting 
considerable differences of opinions among independent recording artists). 
52 See Spotify Explained: How We Pay Royalties: An Overview, SPOTIFY: ARTISTS (2013), https://
www.spotifyartists.com/spotify-explained/#how-we-pay-royalties-overview [https://perma.cc/2WQF-
GLXX] (“We pay out nearly 70% of our total revenue to rights holders.”). 
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the recording contracts that labels have with artists, very little of that revenue 
made its way to recording artists.53 
Perhaps surprisingly, as adoption of streaming services has skyrocketed, 
demand for vinyl records, a decidedly analog format, has surged as well. In 
2014, vinyl sales increased more than fifty percent over the prior year.54 The 
same held true in 2015.55 Vinyl is generally the most expensive way to get new 
music, but it offers arguably higher fidelity and better packaging. Importantly, 
it also confers to buyers the full range of property interests traditionally 
associated with a purchase. 
B. Mixed Messages for Consumers 
The concurrent rise in popularity of these two means of acquiring 
music—subscription streaming and vinyl records—highlights the importance 
of consumer choice. Some consumers prefer low-cost temporary access, and 
others prefer high-cost permanent access. For any particular consumer, those 
preferences can vary over time, across media types, and between particular 
artists or titles. When it comes to the stark choice between streaming and 
vinyl, it is easy for consumers to gather the information necessary to 
formulate and exercise those preferences. Significant price differences, the 
requirement of ongoing payment for subscriptions, and the presence or 
absence of a physical artifact are all salient features of a transaction that help 
consumers distinguish between these two models. But in other parts of the 
digital economy, the lines are much less clear. 
Elsewhere, consumers are confronted with marketing language that appears 
to be in tension with the text of the licenses associated with those transactions. 
A consumer browsing digital movies on the Apple iTunes store, for example, 
might see an ad inviting them to “Own It in HD.”56 But what does it mean to 
Apple and to consumers to “own” a digital movie? If Apple’s terminology draws 
 
53 See Tim Ingham, Major Labels Keep 73% of Spotify Premium Payouts – Report, MUSIC BUS. 
WORLDWIDE (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/artists-get-7-of-streaming-cash
-labels-take-46/ [https://perma.cc/3XBQ-4ZSV] (citing an Ernst & Young study that revealed that 
record labels kept 73% of payments from streaming services, while songwriters and recording artists 
collected just 16% and 11% of those payments, respectively). 
54 See Keith Caulfield, Vinyl Album Sales Hit Historic High in 2014, Again, BILLBOARD (Dec. 31, 
2014), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/6422442/vinyl-album-sales-hit-historic-high
-2014 [https://perma.cc/C2GZ-P8BU] (“Sales of [vinyl albums] grew by 52 percent in 2014 to 9.2 
million copies (up from 6.1 million in 2013).”). In absolute terms, the number was 9.2 million units, 
the largest vinyl tally in decades. Id. 
55 See JOSHUA P. FRIEDLANDER, RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., NEWS AND NOTES 
ON 2015 MID-YEAR RIAA SHIPMENT AND REVENUE STATISTICS (2015), http://www.riaa.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/2015_RIAAMidYear_ShipmentData.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8GX-CPUP] 
(“Vinyl was up 52% by value for the first half of the year.”). 
56 See Movies, ITUNES (offering consumers the option to “Own It in HD”).  
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on a frame of reference established by consumers’ experience with physical 
products, Apple’s message is inconsistent with the terms for its digital products. 
The license maintains that consumers may not “modify, rent, loan, sell, or 
distribute” the movies and music they acquire from iTunes.57 Likewise, 
Amazon urges its customers to Buy Now for both physical objects and digital 
files.58 But Amazon’s terms for digital goods reveal similar restrictions for 
digital goods that do not encumber their physical counterparts.59 
In some instances, ownership is touted as an explicit selling point of 
digital content. When publisher Image Comics announced a digital storefront 
for comic books, it distinguished itself from competitors by claiming that its 
customers actually owned their downloads.60 As Image’s Director of Business 
Development explained at the time, “There’s something to be said for the 
ownership factor. If readers purchase a book on [a competitor’s service], . . . 
that could be revoked. And God forbid, if [the competitor] goes under or 
their data center has an earthquake all their hard drives go away—then you’ve 
got nothing.”61 However, despite making promises of ownership, Image 
Comics’s terms were in line with other digital retailers that offer a license 
instead of ownership: 
You shall not share, lend, lease, rent, sell, license, sublicense, transfer, network, 
reproduce, display, distribute, or otherwise make any Digital Comic available 
to any other person, to the extent that doing so requires making a copy of the 
Digital Comic (e.g., a copy on a hard drive, RAM, flash memory, a paper copy, 
etc.). A Digital Comic may be shared only by sharing the device containing 
the Digital Comic.62 
 
57 Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14. 
58 See Guardians of the Galaxy (Theatrical), AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Guardians-Galaxy-
Theatrical-Chris-Pratt/dp/B00QROH0QK/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1481933738&sr=8-1&keywords=
guardians+of+the+galaxy [https://perma.cc/487M-PB2W] (offering consumers the option to “Rent 
Movie HD” or “Buy Movie HD”). 
59 For example, Amazon provides that “[u]nless specifically indicated otherwise, [customers] 
may not sell, rent, lease, [or] distribute . . . any rights to the Kindle Content.” Kindle Store Terms of 
Use, supra note 14. Amazon’s MP3 store offers similar terms. Although Amazon customers “purchase” 
music, payment merely “grant[s] [customers] a non-exclusive, non-transferable right to use Purchased 
Music . . . only for [customers’] personal, non-commercial purposes . . . . [Further, customers] may not 
redistribute, . . . sell, . . . rent, share, lend, . . . or otherwise transfer or use Purchased Music . . . .” 
Amazon Music Terms of Use, supra note 14. 
60 See Laura Hudson, For the First Time, You Can Actually Own the Digital Comics You Buy, WIRED: 
CULTURE (July 2, 2013, 2:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/07/drm-free-comics-download-image/ 
[https://perma.cc/3GNV-JR5K] (reporting that Image Comics would be the “first major U.S. 
publisher” to allow consumers to download DRM-free comics to their hard drives). 
61 Id. 
62 Terms and Conditions, IMAGE COMICS, https://imagecomics.com/about/terms-and-conditions 
[https://perma.cc/TFL3-XJGZ]. 
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These conflicts between advertising and legal terms are not limited to the 
mass market. HeinOnline offers a massive database of legal publications, 
including law journals, judicial opinions, statutes, and treaties from around 
the world on a subscription basis. In recent years, HeinOnline introduced 
Digital Ownership Program, a new way to access its content. As HeinOnline 
explains the program, by “purchasing digital ownership,” users can “obtain 
ownership rights to PDF files” delivered on a hard drive.63 However, the 
terms of service for the Digital Ownership Program, which are not available 
for review on the HeinOnline website, prohibit “owners” of those files from 
transferring them.64 So a library would not be allowed, for example, to loan 
or give its hard drive to another institution.65 
Sophisticated institutional consumers like libraries will often be capable 
of reconciling marketing terms like “buy” and “own” with the more complex 
picture revealed by license terms.66 But it remains to be seen, however, whether 
and to what extent the average consumer is getting what she bargained for. 
 
63 Digital Ownership, HEINONLINE: SERVICES, http://home.heinonline.org/services/ownership/ 
[https://perma.cc/DK62-558M]. 
64 Those terms provide in relevant part that “[c]ustomer[s] may not: (i) sell, distribute, publicly 
display or in any other way exploit (commercially or otherwise) the Collection(s) or portions thereof, 
by any means, including, without limitation, sale, exchange, barter, transfer, assignment, or 
distribution, (ii) transfer, assign or sublicense any of the Customer’s rights or obligations under this 
Agreement.” Email from HeinOnline to Aaron Perzanowski, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve 
Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan. 13, 2015, 4:18 PM) (on file with author). 
65 Random House used similar language when its Vice President of Library and Academic 
Marketing and Sales told Library Journal, “Random House’s often repeated, and always consistent 
position is this: when libraries buy their RH, Inc. ebooks from authorized library wholesalers, it is 
our position that they own them.” Michael Kelley, Random House Says Libraries Own Their Ebooks, 
LIBR. J.: LJ INSIDER (Oct. 18, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://lj.libraryjournal.com/2012/10/opinion/random-
house-says-libraries-own-their-ebooks-lj-insider [https://perma.cc/DP58-T93P]. Random House later 
clarified that by “owning,” it meant that libraries could move the books they license between 
competing DRM-protected ebook vendors like Overdrive. See Mike Masnick, Turns Out When 
Random House Said Libraries ‘Own’ Their Ebooks, It Meant, ‘No, They Don’t Own Them,’ TECHDIRT 
(Oct. 24, 2012, 12:44 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121023/23465120806/turns-out-when-
random-house-said-libraries-own-their-ebooks-it-meant-no-they-dont-own-them.shtml [https://perma.
cc/AW8P-R7RG] (“In fact, at best, when they say ‘own’ they mean ‘if you fit into this limited category, 
you have the right to move your ebooks from one approved platform to another approved platform.’”). 
66 We do not mean to concede here that licenses necessarily dictate the rights of consumers. 
Some courts have recognized that purported license terms do not necessarily preclude sales. See, e.g., 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that “there [was] no 
evidence to support a conclusion that licenses were established under the terms of the promotional 
statement” because the record was “devoid of any indication that the recipients agreed to a license”); 
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 121, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that the language of 
Section 117(a), which “allows the owner of a copy of a computer program to copy or modify the 
program for limited purposes without incurring liability for infringement,” suggests that the 
protection extends beyond those possessing formal title). 
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II. METHODS: THE MEDIASHOP STUDY 
In order to assess consumer understanding of rights in different kinds of 
media, we conducted a web-based survey of a sample of internet users (N=1299) 
in 2016.67 The sample was representative of the United States population with 
respect to sex, age, and income as measured by 2010 census data.68 In addition, 
we collected demographic information on race,69 geographic region,70 and 
education level.71 Our panel of respondents was drawn from an initial pool of 
7150 Internet users who were invited to participate in our survey. From that 
initial solicitation, 2325 participants began the survey. Out of that group, 1299 
successfully completed the survey instrument.72 
 
67 The survey was administered using the internet survey platform Qualtrics. We are aware of 
the methodological limitations involved in using web-based surveys and that telephone-based surveys 
remain the “gold standard.” However, for this study, a web-delivery mechanism was more appropriate 
because it allowed us to present the respondent with realistic simulations of the online shopping 
experience and because only Internet users can buy media from digital platforms like those studied here. 
68 Our sample was 51% female and 49% male. We limited respondents to this binary choice to 
mirror the 2010 census. In terms of age, 11.3% of our sample was between the ages of 18–24, 35% was 
between 25–44, 35% was between 45–64, and 18% of respondents were 65 or older. This closely 
matches the U.S. population as of 2010. See LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS NO. C2010BR-03, AGE AND 
SEX COMPOSITION: 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Z792-HQVW] (showing the age and sex breakdown of the U.S. population). 
69 Our sample was also roughly representative of the U.S. population with respect to race. 
Whites were slightly overrepresented, comprising 80% of our sample. Black and Latino respondents 
were underrepresented at 9% and 6% of our sample, respectively. Asian and Native American 
respondents made up 4.2% and 0.6% of our sample, respectively, figures roughly in line with national 
figures. See KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2010 
CENSUS BRIEFS NO. C2010BR-02, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 7 tbl.3 
(2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/99EH-MAY2] 
(showing the racial breakdown of the U.S. population). However, we saw no significant relationship 
between race and survey responses. 
70 Regionally, our sample included a representative number of Southerners and 
Midwesterners. But Northeasterners were overrepresented—roughly 27% in our sample versus 18% 
in the population—while Westerners were somewhat underrepresented, comprising 15% of our 
sample versus 23% of the population. See PAUL MACKUN & STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS NO. C2010BR-01, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 
AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-
01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NZT-4QT4] (showing the geographic breakdown of the U.S. population). 
However, we saw no significant correlation between region and survey responses. 
71 We asked respondents to report the highest level of education they had completed. They 
responded as follows: Less than High School, 2%; High School/GED, 22%; Some College, 28%; 2-
year College Degree, 11%; 4-year College Degree, 25%; Masters Degree, 10%; Doctoral Degree, 1%; 
Professional Degree (e.g., JD, MD), 1%. These results roughly match 2009 U.S. Census data. See 
CAMILLE L. RYAN & JULIE SIEBENS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS NO. P20-566, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2009, at 6 tbl.1 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p20-566.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y4NX-MH59] (reporting educational attainment data for Americans over the age of twenty-five). 
72 Most of the other 1026 responses were excluded for failing to meet our demographic criteria; 
incomplete responses were also excluded. 
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In addition to demographic questions, we asked a series of screening 
questions to limit respondents to those who were in the market for digital 
books, music, or movies.73 We posed three questions to respondents: 
1. Have you paid for digital music in the past 12 months, or do you plan to do 
so in the next 12 months? 
2. Have you paid for an ebook in the past 12 months, or do you plan to do so 
in the next 12 months? 
3. Have you paid for digital movies in the past 12 months, or do you plan to 
do so in the next 12 months? 
The order of these questions was randomized for each participant. As 
soon as a respondent answered “Yes” to one of the questions, the participant 
was placed in the corresponding group: music, books, or movies. Respondents 
who answered “No” to all three questions were disqualified from the survey. 
The size of each media group was capped to yield equally-sized groups of 433 
respondents for each of books, music, and movies. 
Next, we prompted respondents to select a particular media title. Most 
surveys test products chosen by the researcher. Instead, we showed 
respondents within each media category a number of specific titles and asked 
them to choose the one that interested them most. We selected these titles 
from Amazon’s then-current list of best sellers and attempted to offer a 
diverse cross-section of genres.74 This process allowed us to more closely 
replicate marketplace conditions and increase respondent engagement. 
A. The MediaShop Site 
To test how respondents react to a Buy Now button, we created a fictional 
online commerce site called MediaShop. The MediaShop site features design 
elements familiar to Internet shoppers—a header with a search bar, navigation 
elements, a shopping cart, a product image, a product description, user ratings, 
the price of the good, and some mechanism for completing the transaction. 
In arranging these various elements, as seen in Figure 1 below, we modeled 
MediaShop on existing online retail sites like Amazon, Target, and Walmart. 
 
73 Our study focused on digital music, books, and videos, but similar tensions surrounding user 
rights arise in software products such as games and apps as well. For more information, see Lothar 
Determann and David Nimmer, Software Copyright’s Oracle from the Cloud, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
161 (2015), which discusses copyright law in the software context. 
74 For books, respondents were given a choice between: Bum Rap by Paul Levine, The Girl on the 
Train by Paula Hawkins, The Martian by Andy Weir, and All the Light We Cannot See by Anthony Doerr. 
For music, the choices were: 1989 by Taylor Swift, Before This World by James Taylor, American 
Beauty/American Psycho by Fall Out Boy, and To Pimp a Butterfly by Kendrick Lamar. And for movies, 
choices included: Kingsman: The Secret Service, The Imitation Game, Pitch Perfect, and Guardians of the Galaxy.  
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After selecting a particular title, each respondent was then shown one of 
four product page variations. Those variations differed with regard to both the 
type of product displayed and the button used to complete the transaction. For 
three of the four variations, respondents saw digital goods—ebooks, MP3s, or 
movie downloads—with three different transaction labels (n=970). 
Some respondents saw digital goods with the Buy Now button (Figure 2, 
n=333); others saw a License Now button (Figure 3, n=310); and a third group saw 
a short notice that enumerated the uses that respondents could and could not 
make of the digital media good if purchased (Figure 4, n=327). For the fourth 
variation, respondents saw a physical good—paperbacks, CDs, or Blu-ray discs—
and the standard Buy Now button (Figure 13, n=329). Roughly equal numbers of 
respondents were presented with each of these four product page variations. 
Next, respondents were instructed to review that page as they normally 
would when acquiring media goods online. Notably, each digital good product 
page included a link to the MediaShop Terms of Use, which fully described the 
restrictions on the good’s use and transfer. Of the 970 respondents who viewed 
the product pages, only fourteen clicked on the Terms of Use link, a rate of 1.4%.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 The language of the MediaShop Terms of Use was based on Amazon’s Kindle Store terms. 
See Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 14. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents were presented with a range of products to choose from. This image depicts an 
ebook paired with the Buy Now button. 
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B. Assessing Consumer Understanding of Rights 
After respondents viewed the product page, we asked them a series of 
questions concerning their understanding of the Buy Now, License Now, or 
short notice conditions, as well as their beliefs about the rights they had 
acquired by paying for the media good. We began with open-ended questions 
such as, “When you see the phrase Buy Now, what, if anything, does it mean 
to you?” Next, we posed a set of more specific closed-ended questions. We 
asked respondents who viewed a book, for example, whether—after clicking 
the appropriate button—they owned the book, could lend it to a friend, could 
resell it, could read it on the device of their choice, could leave it to a friend or 
family member in their will, could keep it for as long as they wanted, could give 
it as a gift, or could make copies of it for others. We posed slightly modified 
versions of each of these questions for each media type. Respondents could 
choose “Yes,” “No,” or “I don’t know.”76 Most of these questions were designed 
 
76 We included the following instruction: “If you aren’t certain, make the best selection based 
on the information you have. If you cannot make an informed choice, select ‘I don’t know.’” In part, 
we included this instruction to reduce the risk of “satisficing,” a strategy of choosing the answer that 
most reduces the burden of responding. See Jon A. Krosnick et al., Satisficing in Surveys: Initial 
Evidence, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EVALUATION, Summer 1996, at 29, 30-31 (suggesting that fatigue 
and work avoidance behaviors in survey respondents can impact results and data quality). 
A quarter of respondents were presented
with a Buy Now button paired with a digital
good. Another quarter were presented with a
Buy Now button paired with a tangible good.
A quarter of respondents were presented
with a License Now button paired with a
digital good. 
A quarter of respondents were presented 
with this short notice concerning rights in 
digital goods. 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
2017] What We Buy When We Buy Now 335 
to gauge the degree to which respondents believed they were entitled to engage 
in particular behaviors. However, we asked whether respondents “own” the 
media good as a measure of their overall impression of the transaction. 
C. Assessing Whether Rights Matter to Consumers 
For three particular behaviors—lending, reselling, and using the device of 
the consumer’s choice—we posed a set of follow-up questions designed to 
measure the degree to which respondents valued those rights and the degree to 
which their presence or absence influences purchasing decisions.77 We began by 
asking respondents to state their preference for media goods on the basis of these 
behaviors on a five-point scale. Next, we asked respondents how much more, if 
anything, they would be willing to spend for a media good that could be used in 
the manner described—lent, resold, or used on the device of the respondent’s 
choice. These questions were intended to determine the extent to which 
respondents’ stated preferences would translate into behavior in the marketplace. 
Finally, we gathered data intended to reveal the impact of the ability to 
engage in these three behaviors on the means by which respondents would 
acquire or access copyrighted material. We began by asking whether 
respondents were familiar with subscription streaming sites like Netflix and 
Spotify. We then asked those who were familiar a set of follow-up questions 
that inquired whether or not the respondents would be more likely to access 
a media title through such a service if they could not acquire a copy that could 
be lent, resold, or used on their device of choice. We then asked a similar set 
of questions about unauthorized downloading of works to those who reported 
being familiar with BitTorrent or The Pirate Bay. 
III. RESULTS 
The MediaShop survey reveals a number of insights about how consumers 
understand—or misunderstand—digital transactions. A surprisingly high 
percentage of consumers believe that when they Buy Now, they acquire the 
same sort of rights to use and transfer digital media goods that they acquire 
when they purchase physical goods. The data also strongly suggest that these 
rights matter to consumers. They are willing to pay more for those rights, and 
they are more likely to acquire media through other means, both lawful and 
unlawful, in the absence of those rights. Finally, our study suggests that a 
 
77 Asking these follow-up questions for each behavior would have significantly increased the 
time necessary to complete the survey, likely reducing both complete responses and the reliability 
of those responses. See Andy Peytchev, Survey Breakoff, PUB. OPINION Q., Spring 2009, at 74, 85 
fig.2 (noting the impact of survey length on participation and completion). The median time of 
completion in the MediaShop survey was 607 seconds, that is, just over ten minutes. 
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relatively simple and inexpensive intervention—adding a short notice to a 
digital product page that outlines consumer rights in straightforward language—
is an effective means of significantly reducing consumer misperceptions. 
A. How Consumers Understand Their Rights 
Across the four notice conditions, we observed significant variations in 
the frequency with which respondents believed that they had obtained rights 
to engage in particular behaviors after completing a transaction. On the 
whole, respondents who saw the Buy Now button for a physical good 
understood their rights most accurately.78 Those who saw the same Buy Now 
button on a digital good apparently carried over assumptions from physical 
goods, and reported the least accurate beliefs about their rights. Our two 
interventions for digital goods—the License Now button and the short 
notice—both reduced mistaken beliefs among respondents, but the short 
notice was considerably more effective.79 
1. Buy Now for Digital Goods 
Roughly one quarter of our respondents viewed a digital product page 
that included the familiar Buy Now button. Their responses to a series of 
questions about what rights, if any, they acquired after completing that 
transaction are summarized in Figure 5 below. 
 
78 Respondents’ perceptions of their rights varied between groups with certain demographic 
and behavioral characteristics. Men were significantly more likely than women to believe that they 
could resell, give away, leave in a will, and make copies of the good for others. In terms of age, 
respondents between the ages of 25 and 34 were considerably more likely—and respondents over 
the age of 65 considerably less likely—to believe they had the right to lend, resell, give away, or leave 
a media good in their wills. We also asked respondents how frequently they acquired media online, 
lend their physical media, and resell their physical media. The more frequently respondents engaged 
in those behaviors, the more likely they were to answer “Yes” when asked about their rights. 
79 These general conclusions are also supported by our open-ended questions. Respondents 
who viewed the Buy Now button were far more likely than those who viewed either the short notice 
or License Now conditions to express the view that they were purchasing a media good. In fact, 577 
Buy Now respondents (n=662), split nearly equally between digital and analog shoppers, said that 
Buy Now meant they were making a purchase. In comparison, only 87 License Now respondents 
(n=310) expressed that belief. For the short notice, that number dropped to 29 (n=327). Conversely, 
respondents were significantly less likely to express the view that Buy Now implied any limits on 
their use and enjoyment of the media good. No analog shopper identified such limits, and only one 
Buy Now digital shopper did. That number increased moderately, to 14, for those who saw the License 
Now button. But 141 of those who viewed the short notice responded that it imposed some rule or 
limitation on their use. 72 short notice users indicated specifically that they were not allowed to 
share or sell the media. Likewise, the number of respondents who said a copyright license was being 
proposed depended on which notice condition they saw. Again, no physical shoppers made that 
claim, and one Buy Now digital shopper indicated the transaction gave the user a license. Not 
surprisingly, that number shot up to 77 under the License Now condition. More interestingly, 32 
respondents said the short notice communicated that a license was in the offering.  
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Figure 5: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now”  
Confers Rights in Digital Goods (n=333) 
 
A sizable majority of respondents—just over 83%—believed that after 
clicking the Buy Now button, they owned the digital good in question. 
Ownership is both a complex legal conclusion and an intuitive claim about an 
individual’s relationship to a product. It is also a concept the precise contours 
of which are contested in the digital economy.80 In that sense, a claim about 
ownership is not falsifiable; it is more like a gauge of a consumer’s overall 
impression of a transaction.81 Nonetheless, the high affirmative response rate 
to this question seems to belie the claims made by some rights holders and 
retailers that consumers understand perfectly well that when they click Buy 
Now they are simply acquiring a license.82 
More than 86% of respondents who saw the Buy Now button believed that 
they were entitled to keep their digital purchase for as long as they wanted.83 That 
is typically the case with physical media. You can keep your hardcover books or 
vinyl records forever, barring theft, fire, or some other disaster. 
 
80 See generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: 
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016) (discussing competing notions of 
ownership in the context of the digital marketplace). 
81 We were able to identify the substantive rights respondents most closely associated with 
ownership. The right to keep the good forever was most predictive of a respondent’s claim of ownership, 
followed closely by the rights to leave the good in one’s will, to give it away, and to resell it. 
82 See supra note 26. 
83 Honoré referred to this entitlement as both “the right of possession” and “the absence of 
term.” Honoré, supra note 2, at 113-15, 121-23. 
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For digital goods, the same is not true. Access to one’s media in the digital 
world is more contingent, as digital-good sellers have the ability to affect 
consumers after the initial transaction. Transactions for such digital goods are 
continuous and subject to both business failures and petty meddling from 
service providers. Contract law affords digital platforms protection against suit, 
while the technological affordances of the platform shape users’ rights in 
surprising, non-negotiable ways.84 For instance, digital retailers might go out 
of business or decide to shut down their media servers.85 They might shift to a 
subscription model, converting purchases to rentals.86 They might wipe clean 
customer accounts or devices for violating their terms of service.87 They might 
deny consumers access to purchases made in one country when they move to 
another.88 They might remotely delete purchases, as Amazon and Apple have 
done.89 Or they might decide, as Barnes and Noble recently did, to deny 
customers access to their purchased ebooks when their credit cards expire.90 
 
84 Cf. Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information 
Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 81 (2015) (describing how technology allows companies to monitor 
and enforce agreements in previously unknown ways). 
85 See supra text accompanying note 10 (discussing the difficulty customers have accessing 
digital purchases when companies file for bankruptcy or shut down). 
86 See Nate Hoffelder, Scholastic to Close Storia eBookstore; Customers Could Lose Access to Their 
eBook Purchases, DIGITAL READER (July 27, 2014), http://the-digital-reader.com/2014/07/27/scholastic-
close-storia-ebookstore-customers-will-lose-access-ebook-purchases/#.U_fFdvSE-a5 [https://perma.cc
/7GLH-SDAR] (describing academic publisher Scholastic’s shutdown of its educational ebook store 
in favor of a subscription service and its message to consumers that “[t]he switch to streaming means 
that eBooks you’ve previously purchased may soon no longer be accessible”). 
87 Linn Nygaard, a Norwegian Kindle customer, lost dozens of ebooks she bought from 
Amazon. They vanished without notice when Amazon erased her Kindle, citing unspecified “abuse 
of [its] policies.” Mark King, Amazon Wipes Customer’s Kindle and Deletes Account with No Explanation, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/oct/22/amazon-wipes
-customers-kindle-deletes-account [https://perma.cc/3JGA-5LJK]. Nygaard’s account, which was later 
reinstated, likely violated Amazon’s terms because the Kindle Store had not yet launched in Norway. 
See Michelle Jaworski, Amazon Restores Kindle User’s Mysteriously-Deleted Account, Still No Explanation, 
DAILY DOT (Oct. 23, 2012, 5:54 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/news/amazon-linn-nygaard-deleted-account
-restored/ [https://perma.cc/UXA5-ASU4] (noting that Nygaard’s problems seemed to stem from the 
fact that “because she lived in Norway, where Amazon has no offices, she [was told that she] would 
have to provide a U.K. address to get the replacement” when her Kindle broke while she was traveling). 
88 Purchases from the Apple iTunes store are linked to the user’s home country address, and 
Apple warns users that if they switch countries in their iTunes account, “You won’t see the items 
that you purchased from the previous country’s store in your Purchased section.” Change Your iTunes 
Store Country or Region, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201389?cid=tw_sr [https://perma.
cc/FQ8F-KHNM] (last updated Sept. 22, 2016). 
89 See supra text accompanying notes 5 and 39. 
90 See Tim Cushing, Barnes & Noble Decides that Purchased Ebooks Are Only Yours Until Your 
Credit Card Expires, TECHDIRT (Nov. 27, 2012, 11:42 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121126
/18084721154/barnes-noble-decides-that-purchased-ebooks-are-only-yours-until-your-credit-card-expires.
shtml [https://perma.cc/AD6V-TK6W] (describing how customers could no longer access purchases 
when their credit cards expired). 
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Moreover, risk-of-loss and termination provisions that are common in license 
agreements insulate retailers from any legal liability for these behaviors.91 
An almost equally large majority of respondents believed that when they 
clicked Buy Now, they could use the digital media on the device of their choice. 
For consumers with various makes and models of laptops, smartphones, tablets, 
ereaders and media players, the appeal of that freedom is easy to understand. 
In some cases, consumers are correct in their belief. But in others, they are 
mistaken. Unfortunately, the factors that determine whether consumers are 
right or wrong are not easy to assess. Some retailers have embraced the diversity 
of the digital ecosystem. Amazon, for example, supports a wide range of devices 
for digital media, from its own Kindle line to Apple iOS and Android devices, 
including even the latest NOOK ereader from its competitor Barnes and Noble. 
Amazon sees the ability to read ebooks on a buyer’s device of choice as a selling 
point. Its choice to sell music in the standard MP3 format paints a similar picture. 
But other retailers have taken a more closed approach to device 
compatibility. Apple’s iBooks can only be read on Apple devices. The same is 
true for iTunes music and movies. Through a combination of license terms, 
proprietary file formats, and DRM, Apple has tethered the media it sells to 
its own hardware. That choice reveals the differing business philosophies of 
Apple and Amazon. Amazon works hard to keep prices low to attract an ever-
larger customer base.92 It sells Kindle ereaders and tablets at break-even 
prices and may actually lose money on each sale,93 but it hopes to profit in 
the long run by increasing sales of its content.94 Apple—despite selling 
billions of dollars’ worth of apps, movies, and music—is in the hardware 
business. And its profit margin on devices like the iPhone 6 has been 
estimated to be as high as sixty-nine percent, leading to quarterly profits of 
 
91 Consider the following language: 
Risk of Loss. Risk of loss for Kindle Content transfers when you download or access 
the Kindle Content . . . . 
Termination. Your rights under this Agreement will automatically terminate if you 
fail to comply with any term of this Agreement. In case of such termination, you must 
cease all use of the Service, and Amazon may immediately revoke your access to the 
Service without refund of any fees. Amazon’s failure to insist upon or enforce your 
strict compliance with this Agreement will not constitute a waiver of any of its rights. 
Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 14. 
92 See Kelly Clay, Amazon Confirms It Makes No Profit on Kindles, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2012, 1:10 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2012/10/12/amazon-confirms-it-makes-no-profit-on-kindles/ 
[https://perma.cc/AY58-4A87] (reporting that Amazon derives its profits from sales of content, not 
Kindles); Steve Kovach, Amazon Will Lose Millions Selling the Kindle Fire, But That’s the Point, BUS. 
INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kindle-fire-profit-margins-2011-9 [https:
//perma.cc/AT98-AQAF] (noting that Amazon was selling Kindle Fire at a loss to “gain rapid adoption”). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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over ten billion dollars.95 Apple has every incentive to keep its customers, and 
their media purchases, within its ecosystem. 
Ultimately, whether buyers are correct in their belief about device 
compatibility depends on choices made by retailers, rather than their own legal 
rights. In the MediaShop study, for example, the license limited respondents 
to the use of “Supported Devices.” Of course, only a handful knew that, since 
the vast majority did not read the license terms. 
Lending is a widely recognized right of property owners.96 Book lending 
is a centuries-old American cultural practice,97 and people have been lending 
music and movies for as long as they have been available for sale. The same 
is true for gift-giving. More than 40% of survey respondents believed that 
lending and gift-giving rights persist when they “Buy Now” in the digital 
marketplace.98 However, nearly every license for digital goods forbids lending 
and gifts. The Amazon Instant Video and MP3 stores, Apple iTunes, Google 
Play, Sony Playstation Network, Microsoft Xbox Live, and countless smaller 
digital retailers explicitly bar consumers from lending, renting, giving away, 
or otherwise transferring their purchases.99 
 
95 See Oscar Williams-Grut, Apple’s iPhone: The Most Profitable Product in History, INDEPENDENT 
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/apples-iphone-the-
most-profitable-product-in-history-10009741.html [https://perma.cc/3ZTU-KYW8] (reporting Apple’s 
quarterly profits and industry estimates that the profit margin on the iPhone 6 could reach sixty-
nine percent); see also Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple’s Market Cap Loses $60 Billion After iPhone Sales 
Disappoint, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2015, 10:02 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-earnings-boosted-
by-iphone-sales-1437510647 [https://perma.cc/W6L7-PP2F] (noting that “[t]he iPhone now overshadows 
the rest of Apple’s businesses”). 
96 See Honoré, supra note 2, at 118 (noting that “the right to the capital” includes “the power to 
alienate the thing”); O’Reilly, supra note 1. 
97 Benjamin Franklin, for example, founded the Library Company of Philadelphia in 1731. See 
LIBRARY CO. OF PHILA., “AT THE INSTANCE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN”: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
LIBRARY COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA 5 (2015), http://www.librarycompany.org/about/Instance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FK67-XW2B] (describing how Benjamin Franklin and his friends pooled their 
money so they could afford to import books). 
98 In theory, respondents could have misunderstood this question as one asking whether they 
could lend their physical device—a Kindle or an iPad—containing a digital media title rather than 
asking, as we intended, whether they could lend that particular digital media purchase. We carefully 
designed the wording of our questions to avoid this possibility by asking whether respondents could 
lend the particular “ebook,” “MP3 album,” or “movie” for which they paid. 
Since the questions were phrased identically, the responses we received to questions concerning 
gifts and resale also bolster our confidence that respondents did not misinterpret our questions. 
Although a substantial number of respondents reported believing that they could engage in these 
activities, we would have expected those numbers to be considerably higher if they read the questions 
to be inquiring into their ability to resell, give away, or lend their Kindle or iPad. See infra subsection 
III.A.4 (discussing participants’ responses to questions addressing the Buy Now button for physical 
goods). In analyzing our open-ended questions, only five of the 333 consumers presented with the 
Buy Now button signaled that it could mean an ability to lend the device to others. 
99 See Amazon Music Terms of Use, supra note 14 (“[Y]ou may not . . . assign, . . . rent, share, 
lend, . . . license or otherwise transfer or use Purchased Music . . . .”); Amazon Video Terms of Use, 
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In response to consumer demand, some retailers have introduced programs 
that mimic certain aspects of traditional lending. The Kindle and NOOK stores 
both offer restricted lending for some books.100 If publishers opt in, consumers 
can lend an ebook—one time only—for fourteen days. Apple’s Family Sharing 
program allows digital media purchases to be shared with up to six accounts, 
provided the accounts all share the same credit card information.101 But these 
programs do not include all works, and they are limited in fundamental respects 
that render them poor substitutes for a true right to alienate. 
Consumers are accustomed to inheriting physical media. In our study, 
nearly thirty percent of respondents believed they could bequest their ebooks, 
MP3s, and digital movies in their wills.102 Thus, it appears that for many, the 
expectations established in the tangible era have survived the shift to digital 
copies. Although the owner of a computer or hard drive could leave that 
tangible object in her will, that is at best an incomplete solution for transferring 
ownership of digital content. To start, many media libraries are stored on the 
cloud rather than a local device. And when a media library is stored locally, it 
is likely intermingled with other files. A hard drive or laptop might include 
digital music, movies, and books, not to mention emails, financial records, 
and personal photos. If those files cannot be copied to other storage media, 
efforts to effectuate wills could be frustrated. Both public and private efforts 
 
AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201422760 [https://perma.
cc/M4C6-CR66] (last updated Jan. 25, 2016) (“[Y]ou may not . . . rent, lease, [or] distribute . . . any 
right to the Digital Content to any third party . . . .”); Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, 
supra note 14 (“You agree not to modify, rent, loan, sell, or distribute the Services or Content in any 
manner, and you shall not exploit the Services in any manner not expressly authorized.”); Google Play 
Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://play.google.com/about/play-terms.html [https://perma.cc/MX4H-
T5G4] (last updated July 27, 2016) (“You may not . . . rent, lease, redistribute . . . or transfer or assign 
any Content or your rights to Content to any third party without authorization, including with 
regard to any downloads of Content that you may obtain through Google Play.”); Microsoft Services 
Agreement, MICROSOFT: XBOX (Aug. 2015), http://www.xbox.com/en-US/Legal/LiveTOU [https://
perma.cc/4QCJ-LMYK] (“You may not . . . rent, lease or lend the application; or transfer the 
application or this agreement to any third party.”); Terms of Service and User Agreement, supra note 17 
(“You may not . . . rent, lease, [or] loan . . . any portion of the Property.”). 
100 See Jeff Bercovici, A Pretty Good Solution to The Problem of E-Book Lending (Or At Least I Think 
So), FORBES (Aug. 22, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2012/08/22/a-pretty-
good-solution-to-the-e-book-lending-wars-or-at-least-i-think-so [https://perma.cc/QW8W-4AEJ] (describing 
how lending is currently restricted to “short-term, one-time loans of some but not all titles”). 
101 See Family Sharing, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/icloud/family-sharing/ [https://perma.
cc/E7V5-GQME] (“To get started, one adult in your household — the organizer — invites up to 
five additional family members and agrees to pay for any iTunes, iBooks, and App Store purchases 
they initiate while part of the family group.”). 
102 A full 50% of respondents who saw the Buy Now button for digital goods chose “I don’t 
know” when asked this question. 
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to address these sorts of concerns are underway, but they have yet to directly 
confront license restrictions applied to digital media.103 
Likewise, 16% of respondents believed that clicking the Buy Now button 
gives them the right to resell their digital goods. Used booksellers have 
operated in the United States for centuries. Benjamin Franklin and Thomas 
Jefferson built their personal libraries in part by buying used books.104 Used 
record stores have been around for decades, and online resale markets like eBay 
enable the sale of all manner of used media goods. But like lending and gift-
giving, resale is uniformly barred by license terms applied to digital goods.105 
Finally, 14% of respondents believed that they were entitled to make 
copies of the digital good for other people. Although some exceptions apply, 
copyright law generally prohibits this behavior.106 Tellingly, fewer 
respondents answered yes to this question than any other. Nonetheless, a 
considerable percentage of respondents—and particularly those shopping for 
digital music—believed clicking Buy Now gave them this right. This result 
suggests that there is a subset of consumers who tend to overestimate their 
rights. It is also indicative of a potential mismatch between the expectations 
of consumers and the dictates of copyright law. 
 
103 Delaware became the first state to enact the Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, a model 
law developed by the Uniform Law Commission. That law gives heirs and other beneficiaries of an 
estate the power to control digital accounts and assets—including text, audio, video, and software—
and to request transfers or copies of those assets. But the Act contains a crucial limitation: control 
over digital assets is limited “to the extent permitted under . . . any end user license agreement.” 
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Digital Accounts Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (2015); 
see generally UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%
20Digital%20Assets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V7U-R2AL] (“The purpose of this 
act is to vest fiduciaries with the authority to access, control, or copy digital assets and accounts.”). 
California enacted a fiduciary access to digital assets law in September 2016. Revised Uniform 
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, CAL. PROB. CODE § 820 (2016). In terms of private action, 
Google’s Inactive Account Manager and Facebook’s Legacy Contact are tools to facilitate account 
transfer after the death of a user. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook Heir? Time to Choose Who Manages 
Your Account When You Die, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-
heir-time-to-choose-who-manages-your-account-when-you-die-1423738802 [https://perma.cc/5NH6-
SMFB] (noting that Facebook allows users to designate an individual to manage parts of their 
accounts posthumously). 
104 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1364-65 (2013) (“Used-book dealers tell 
us that, from the time when Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson built commercial and personal 
libraries of foreign books, American readers have bought used books published and printed abroad.”). 
105 See, e.g., Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14 (“You agree not to . . . sell 
. . . the Services or Content in any manner . . . .”); Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 14 (“Unless 
specifically indicated otherwise, you may not sell . . . any rights to the Kindle Content . . . .”). 
106 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (providing that “the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords” (emphasis 
added)). This right is not absolute. See id. §§ 107–08 (carving out exceptions to copyright owner’s 
exclusive right to reproduction for libraries and archives, among others). But as a general rule, 
unauthorized reproduction is prohibited. 
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When consumers are presented with digital media goods and the Buy Now 
button, we observe considerable misunderstanding about the rights they 
obtain through those transactions. If the Buy Now button sends a false signal 
to consumers, perhaps another button that better describes the nature of these 
digital transactions would communicate a more accurate set of expectations. 
2. License Now for Digital Goods 
Since the overwhelming majority of retailers and rights holders 
characterize these deals as licenses, we replaced Buy Now with License Now on 
the MediaShop products pages to see what impact, if any, it would have on 
consumers’ perceptions of their rights. The results of this intervention are 
represented for each media type in Figures 6–8. 
The most apparent shift was a reduction in the number of respondents 
who believed they “owned” the digital goods under the License Now scenario. 
For both ebooks and MP3s, we observed a statistically significant decrease—
from 86% to 50%, and from 83% to 62%, respectively.107 The decline for digital 
movies was notable—78% to 69%—but not statistically significant. 
We also saw significant shifts in respondents’ beliefs regarding other 
rights. While the number of respondents who believed they were entitled to 
lend their digital movies actually increased slightly, the number of respondents 
who selected “I don’t know” increased markedly, from 23% under the Buy Now 
condition to 35% for License Now. This suggests respondents were less certain 
about their rights when presented with the option to License Now. 
 A similar effect was visible when it came to the question of whether 
respondents believed they were entitled to keep their digital purchases. For 
ebooks, “I don’t know” responses increased from 7% to 19%, while “No” 
responses decreased from 6% to 0%. For digital movies, the number of 
respondents who believed they were entitled to keep the movie indefinitely 
decreased by 9%, while “I don’t know” responses increased by 13%. 
Finally, for digital movies we saw an increase in the percentage of 
consumers who believed they were entitled to resell their digital goods. 
Although this increase—from 17% to 23%—fell just short of significance, it 
was accompanied by a 15% drop in “No” responses and a 10% increase in “I 
don’t know” responses. 
 
 
107 We define statistical significance as p <0.05 using Pearson’s chi-squared test. 
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Figures 6: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and 
“License Now” Confer Rights for ebooks 
 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and  
“License Now” Confer Rights for MP3s 
 
 
 
The License Now button reduced the number of affirmative responses to the ownership question 
but had little other effect. 
The License Now button reduced the number of affirmative responses to the ownership question 
but had little other effect. 
2017] What We Buy When We Buy Now 345 
Figure 8: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and  
“License Now” Confer Rights for Digital Movies 
 
Overall, the License Now intervention suggests that the language used to 
characterize a transaction does have an impact on what rights consumers 
believe they acquire. But the term “license” conveys an unclear message to 
online shoppers. Given the range of terms a license may contain and the fact 
that most consumers have never read those terms, we are not surprised to 
find that the License Now button conveys inconsistent messages to consumers. 
3. Short Notice of Rights for Digital Goods 
In addition to the License Now button, we tested a second intervention 
that informed consumers about the specific rights they obtained in their 
digital goods. This intervention operated from the premise that a single word 
like “buy” or “license” is unlikely to capture the complex and perhaps 
counterintuitive set of rights that retailers and rights holders envision in the 
digital marketplace. Instead, we supplemented the existing license terms with 
a short, prominent, easily readable, bullet-point list of the behaviors consumers 
could engage in and those that they could not. This approach builds on prior 
experience with layered notice schemes that employ a simple, short notice to 
alert individuals of the most salient terms contained in a longer, less-accessible 
For digital movies, exposure to the License Now button had a mixed effect on respondents. 
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document.108 From online privacy policies,109 HIPAA disclosures,110 and credit 
solicitations,111 layered notices have been encouraged or required as a way to 
increase consumer comprehension of complex agreements or legal regimes. 
Yet notice remains a controversial approach in consumer protection. In 
their 2013 book, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider summarized a wealth 
of research on disclosure rules and argued that mandated disclosure simply does 
not work.112 The notice model, they argued, makes assumptions about human 
behavior and thinking that simply are not true in practice.113 The duo also 
argued that notice leads to lazy policymaking that avoids tough questions by 
simply putting more and more notices before consumers that go unread.114 
Further research has explored how consumers respond to notice in the 
privacy context. In one study, Ben-Shahar and Adam Chilton illustrated how 
different privacy notices of varying quality fail to change consumer behavior or 
their knowledge of privacy practices.115 In addition, Aleecia M. McDonald et al. 
tested several alternatives of privacy policies, but found that layered notices, 
standard policies, and a process that presented practices as bullet points all 
 
108 See Nathaniel Good, Jens Grossklags, David Thaw, Aaron Perzanowski, Deirdre Mulligan, 
& Joseph Konstan, User Choices and Regret: Understanding Users’ Decision Process About Consensually 
Acquired Spyware, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 283, 294 (2006) (describing multi-layered 
notices, which include a short, condensed notice “layered” on top of the complete, detailed notice in 
order to improve consumer notification efficiency while still complying with legal notice requirements). 
109 See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary but Not Sufficient: Standardized Mechanisms for Privacy 
Notice and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 273, 293 (2012) (describing the use of privacy 
icons as a means of short-form notice for privacy policies); Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable 
Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 
48 (2015) (describing how layered notices are used to “present a website’s privacy policy”). 
110 See Marie C. Pollio, The Inadequacy of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule: The Plain Language Notice of 
Privacy Practices and Patient Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 579, 615 (2004) (describing 
how the United Stated Department of Health and Human Services “permits the notice [to patients] 
to be provided in ‘layered’ format”). 
111 See Prescreen Opt-Out Notice, 16 C.F.R. § 642.3 (2015) (requiring that consumers be 
provided with both “short” and “long” notices); see also Katy K. Liu, Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act Regulations: Disclosure, Opt-Out Rights, Medical Information Usage, and Consumer 
Information Disposal, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 715, 720 (2006) (explaining that the 
Federal Trade Commission “requires a ‘layered notice’ because the FTC believes that [the notice] 
effectively carries out the requirements of the” Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003). 
112 See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
BOILERPLATE 218-21 (2013) (examining the U.S.’s preference for requiring more disclosure as a means 
to protect consumers). 
113 See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 112, at 47 (“[M]any disclosures fail because 
disclosees lack the literacy, intelligence, and sophistication to understand them.”). 
114 See id. at 139 (“Legislatures pass disclosure laws overwhelmingly, partly because they please 
the whole political spectrum.”). 
115 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam S. Chilton, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An 
Experimental Test (Univ. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 737, 2016), http:
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711474 [https://perma.cc/D82Y-F5D4]. 
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performed similarly.116 In the privacy context, there is good reason to believe 
that clearer notices do not improve consumer comprehension of practices. This 
is because consumers see the term “privacy policy” as a seal and assume that its 
presence is a guarantee of protection.117 Yet some researchers have been 
optimistic that notices based on nutrition labels—standardized, prominent, and 
clearly written—could inform consumers of company practice.118 Others have 
called for a “warning label” approach.119 Such an approach was tested by Ben-
Shahar and Chilton, and it resulted in an improvement in consumer 
comprehension of privacy practices.120 As Richard Craswell has observed, Ben-
Shahar’s argument overstates the case against consumer notice and is not in 
conversation with the well-developed literature that recognizes the varied 
purposes and applications of notice regimes.121 Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s 
critique is universalist in approach, yet notices in different contexts do serve a 
useful purpose—consider, for example, the important policy and practice 
contributions that have flowed from security breach notification.122 
To test notice as an approach to digital rights understanding, we designed 
short notices for each of our three media types. As Figure 9 illustrates, the 
chief substantive difference between them is that ebooks and digital movies 
 
116 See Aleecia M. McDonald et al., A Comparative Study of Online Privacy Policies and Formats, 
PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS. 37, 49-50 (2009) (reporting that all of the tested formats “were 
unsatisfactory”). 
117 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economicus, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 282 (2014) (“[I]nternet users falsely believe that privacy policies convey 
specific, legally enforceable rights to users.”). The FTC spent years studying how banks could best 
disclose information-sharing. One of the agency’s conclusions was that such disclosures should not 
be labeled “privacy policies” because consumers interpreted this statement more expansively than 
what legal protections actually provide for financial data. See Symposium Conference on Behavioral 
Economics and Consumer Policy (2007) (statement of Joel Winston, Associate Director, Div. of 
Identify Prot., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n) (explaining that consumers 
specifically believed privacy policies meant the institution never shared the consumers’ information, 
which was usually not the case in practice). 
118 See Patrick Gage Kelley et al., Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of the Nutrition 
Label Approach, ACM-CHI (2010) (evaluating users’ understanding of privacy policies by “[c]ompar[ing] 
two varients of [the ‘nutrition label’] approach with a standardized-text format [and] two formats 
currently in use”). 
119 See generally Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 553 (outlining how the authors’ proposed 
“warning box” would function). 
120 See Ben-Shahar & Chilton, supra note 115, at 25 (finding “a highly statistically significant” 
increase in respondent comprehension after viewing a short warning label of surprising terms). 
Puzzlingly, Ben-Shahar and Chilton concluded that their results suggest “that the simplification of 
disclosures did not change people’s understanding of them.” Id. at 28. 
121 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their 
Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 337-40 (2013) (discussing the broad range of purposes and 
goals that disclosures attempt to serve). 
122 See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 227 
(2016) (“[S]ecurity breach notification laws create strong incentives to collect less trigger information, to 
encrypt it, or to segment it technologically so that name was separate from other trigger information.”). 
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could be used on “approved devices,” while that limitation was omitted from 
the short notice for MP3 albums. We are not trained designers and do not 
hold this particular notice out as the perfect design solution. We are confident 
that experts, given time and resources, could improve on our efforts.123 
Nonetheless, even this proof-of-concept design was effective at improving 
consumers’ understanding of their digital rights.124 
 
 
Figure 9: The MediaShop Short Notices 
 
 
 
Figures 10–12 compare the affirmative answers to questions about consumer 
rights under the Buy Now and short notice conditions. Overall, the short notice 
was considerably more effective in reducing consumer misperceptions of their 
rights than the License Now condition. It is worth noting, however, that in both 
instances respondents encountered the License Now button and the short 
notice provision for the first time during the MediaShop survey. Additionally, 
each respondent viewed those notices only once, likely for no more than 
several seconds. The Buy Now button, in contrast, is a staple of online shopping. 
With repeated consumer interaction with these new notice provisions, we 
expect the effects described below to be even more pronounced.125 
 
123 For example, some respondents complained that the text was too small to be easily read. 
124 One might object that design elements of short notices, and, in particular, the thumbs-up and 
thumbs-down icons, express a normative viewpoint about various rights and restrictions. We do not 
dispute that there is a normative component to our notice design, but we believe it is one that reflects 
the pre-existing preferences of consumers as described in more detail below. See infra Section III.B. 
125 There is some chance that respondents paid greater attention to the short notice because it 
departed from their expectations. One might worry that, over time, it would become less effective 
rather than more. If, in fact, novelty increases consumer attention and decreases deception, that fact 
should inform retailers’ obligations in the design of their advertising. 
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Under the short notice condition, affirmative responses to the ownership 
question dropped significantly for each of the three media types—23% for 
ebooks, 20% for MP3s, and 13% for movies. For lending, we observed significant 
decreases for ebooks and MP3s—13% and 12%, respectively. For digital movies, 
there was no statistically significant change. Likewise, respondents who saw the 
short notice were less likely to believe they were entitled to resell digital 
goods; affirmative responses to that question were cut in half from 12% to 6% 
for ebooks. The results for MP3s were even more dramatic; they dropped 
from 17% to 6%. But again, the results were unchanged for digital movies.126 
When asked if they could leave their digital goods in their wills, ebook 
shoppers who saw the short notice were half as likely as their Buy Now 
counterparts to answer “Yes,” a drop from 26% to 13%. Although they fell 
outside our standard for significance, the results for MP3s and digital movies 
are worth noting. Affirmative responses for MP3s dropped by 11%. For digital 
movies, affirmative responses held steady, but we observed a 14% shift from 
“I don’t know” to “No” when compared to the Buy Now responses, suggesting 
an increase in respondent certainty about their rights. 
Respondents acted similarly when asked about the right to give digital 
media away as a gift. We saw a 10% drop in affirmative responses for ebooks 
and a 14% decrease for MP3s, although neither result was statistically 
significant. And for digital movies, the affirmative response rate was essentially 
unchanged, but we observed a significant increase in “No” responses, up 12%, 
and a corresponding decrease in “I don’t know” responses of 15%.127 
Although our short notice could undoubtedly be improved through testing 
alternative designs, placements, and interactions, it is nonetheless a remarkably 
low-cost intervention. And where false consumer perceptions can be avoided at 
little cost, we might be especially inclined to impose a legal obligation to do so.128 
 
 
126 Respondents who indicated an interest in movies were less likely to be over the age of 65 and less 
likely to be female. Both of those demographics tended to answer “Yes” to these questions less frequently. 
This self-selection bias may be a cause of the misalignment in our results. Cf. infra subsection III.B.1. 
127 Comparing the Buy Now and short notice conditions, respondents were just as likely to answer 
“Yes” when asked about their rights to keep their digital media and use them on their device of choice. 
128 See generally Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657 (1985) 
(arguing in favor of a cost–benefit approach to false advertising claims). 
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Figure 10: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and  
Short Notice Confer Rights for ebooks 
Figure 11: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and 
Short Notice Confer Rights for MP3s 
 
 
 
 
MP3 buyers who see the short notice have a more accurate view of their rights. 
Ebook buyers who see the short notice have a more accurate view of their rights. 
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Figure 12: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe “Buy Now” and 
Short Notice Confer Rights for Digital Movies 
4. Buy Now for Tangible Goods 
Respondents who saw the Buy Now button for tangible goods—paperback 
books, CDs, and Blu-ray discs—demonstrated a considerably more accurate 
understanding of their rights than those who saw the button for digital goods. 
Nonetheless, a surprising number underestimated their ability to transfer the 
products they buy. 
Figure 13 illustrates the responses for those who viewed tangible copy 
product pages with the standard Buy Now button. In contrast to digital media, 
the correct answer to most of these questions was “Yes”—the key exception 
being the right to make copies for others. When it came to ownership, retaining 
possession, using the device of the consumer’s choice, and giving away the copy, 
the results are unsurprising; respondents understood their rights, and very 
few chose “No.” But for three rights—lending, bequeathing, and reselling—
we observed a higher degree of misperception. For lending, 23% and 15% of 
respondents expressed the belief that they could not lend their CDs and Blu-
ray discs, respectively. And across all three media types, 19% of respondents 
believed they could not bequest their tangible media in their wills, and a 
remarkable 36% believed that they could not resell their physical purchases. 
 
 
 
 
The short notice intervention was less successful at informing digital movie buyers of their rights. 
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Figure 13: Percentage Who Believe “Buy Now” Confers Rights for Hard Copies 
How might we explain these misperceptions? And what, if anything, do 
they tell us about deception in the market for digital goods? Given the low 
incidence of “No” responses for several rights, consumers do not appear 
generally confused about their rights in tangible media. So perhaps there is 
something about reselling, bequeathing, and lending that explains these 
misperceptions. Consumers may assume, for example, that because resale 
involves the exchange of money, it crosses some line separating lawful and 
unlawful behavior. Perhaps they are generally unfamiliar with the law of wills. 
And in an era of easy reproduction, they may be less accustomed to the simple 
act of sharing a physical copy. There is no shortage of plausible explanations, 
but on the basis of our data, we cannot endorse any in particular. 
In terms of their implications, these misperceptions about rights in 
tangible media do not detract from our findings for digital goods. A skeptic 
may counter that since consumers are confused about lending and resale when 
it comes to tangible copies, their confusion in the digital space is not cause for 
alarm. But that argument overlooks two key points. First, an ebook and a 
paperback are different products with different attributes. It is no defense to a 
deceptive advertising claim to point out that consumers are also misled about 
The overwhelming majority of respondents had an accurate view of their rights in 
physical media. However, some believed that they did not have the right to lend, gift, 
will, or resell these materials.
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other distinct, but related, products. Second, when it comes to tangible goods, 
consumers underestimate their rights. That is, they think they have fewer rights 
than they acquire in fact. Since consumers buy the product despite their 
misperceptions, that may mean either that those rights are not material or that 
there has been no injury. For digital goods, our data establish just the opposite. 
Consumers overestimate their rights and incorrectly think they are entitled to 
lend, resell, and otherwise transfer their goods when licenses insist they cannot. 
To the extent consumers rely on their experience with tangible media as 
a template for understanding their digital media rights, the misperceptions 
of tangible media respondents may actually reinforce our findings. One way 
to interpret the notable level of confusion among tangible goods consumers 
is that some subset of those consumers is pessimistic about certain rights, 
specifically, lending, reselling, and bequeathing. That subset tends to assume 
the absence of those rights, despite the fact that they have long been clearly 
established by the law. If so, that general pessimism might account for some 
of the respondents who answered “No” to those questions when they 
encountered digital goods. In other words, the confusion we observed for 
tangible goods may be the result of a general pessimism about those rights 
which—if shared by digital media consumers—tamp down the degree of 
misperception we reported for digital goods. 
5. The Rights Score Metric 
In addition to measuring respondents’ beliefs about individual rights, we also 
assessed the accuracy of those beliefs in the aggregate. We scored each 
respondent’s answers according to the criteria in Figure 14. Each correct response 
was worth one point, and each respondent received a score on a scale from 0 to 7. 
 
Figure 14: Rights Scores Correct Responses 
 
  Keep Device Lend Gift Will Resell Copy 
Digital Books 
and Movies 
No No No No No No No 
Digital Music No Yes No No No No No 
Physical Media Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
 
 
 
The table shows the legally correct answers to the rights-based questions used to calculate 
the Rights Score. 
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We categorized “Rights Scores” into three groups: Low (0-2 points, 
representing the 25th percentile of respondents), Medium (3-4 points; the 
median score was 3, and the mean was 3.1), and High (5-7 points, representing 
the 75th percentile of respondents). As Figure 15 depicts, nearly 60% of 
respondents who viewed the Buy Now button for tangible copies received High 
scores, and just 13% received Low scores. Compared to the tangible goods 
Rights Scores, the performance of respondents who viewed the Buy Now and 
License Now buttons for digital goods was practically a mirror image. The 
majority received Low scores: 51% for Buy Now and 58% for License Now. Only 
11% of Buy Now and 12% of License Now respondents got High scores. But the 
short notice condition yielded considerable improvement for digital goods 
Rights Scores: Low scores dropped to 40%, and High scores doubled to 23%. 
 
Figure 15: Percentage Distribution of Rights Scores by Notice Condition 
 
As Figure 16 illustrates, respondents who viewed physical media scored 
highest on average. Their mean score was 4.7 with a median of 5. Among 
respondents who shopped for digital goods, those who viewed the short notice 
performed the best, with a mean of 3 and a median of 3. Those who viewed the 
Buy Now and License Now buttons scored considerably lower. The mean for Buy 
Now respondents was 2.45 with a median of 2. For License Now respondents, 
the mean was 2.27 with a median of 2. With the exception of the insignificant 
difference between Buy Now and License Now for digital goods, changes in 
Respondents who purchased physical media had a high level of knowledge of rights, but 
digital media shoppers had a poorer understanding. 
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notice condition were highly significant with respect to Rights Scores. Our 
short notice was responsible for a significant improvement in respondents’ 
understanding of their rights after a single exposure. 
 
Figure 16: Mean Rights Score by Notice Condition 
 
Ayres and Schwartz have proposed a warning box that “transparently and 
succinctly alert[s] the reader to the unexpected” contract terms as a means of 
improving consumer knowledge and combatting optimism bias in the context of 
online agreements.129 Although our short notice implementation differs in some 
important respects from the government warning box they suggest, the 
significant increase in Rights Scores that we observed for respondents who viewed 
the short notice offers some confirmation of Ayres and Schwartz’s prediction.130 
We observed a significant relationship between Rights Scores and offline 
behavior with respect to physical media. Respondents who reported lending 
 
129 Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 580, 584. 
130 For example, the notice Ayres and Schwartz propose would feature a “government-
provided, standardized” design, would only include terms that were “less favorable than consumers 
expect,” which “must be placed in order of decreasing likelihood that optimistic [consumer] mistakes 
. . . might influence purchase behavior” and would require separate assent to this notice. Id. at 583-84. 
On average, physical media shoppers scored highest, followed by digital media shoppers 
who viewed the short notice, Buy Now, and License Now conditions. 
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and reselling physical media infrequently or not at all were significantly less 
likely to receive Low Rights Scores. This was particularly true for 
respondents who viewed digital books and movies during the MediaShop 
study. It would seem that frequent lending and reselling of physical media 
creates an expectation that those rights extend to digital goods as well. 
We should not expect the market to engage in some sort of spontaneous 
self-correction. Despite a decade of digital media transactions, these 
misperceptions remain widespread. Moreover, there is good reason to doubt 
that a subset of informed consumers can effectively discipline the market in 
a way that protects the interests of misled consumers.131 
Although some degree of misperception is likely unavoidable, the language 
used to market goods has a demonstrable impact. Buy Now communicated a set 
of rights to most consumers. If those rights are not part of the bargained-for 
transaction, retailers can minimize consumer misperceptions through prominent 
use of language that clearly communicates the terms of the deal. But even if 
consumers are mistaken about the bundle of rights that they are getting for 
their money, that fact does not establish that their misperceptions are material 
to their purchasing decisions. 
B. Materiality 
A claim is material to consumers if it influences their decisions in the 
marketplace.132 We measured materiality in three ways. First, we asked 
respondents to state their preferences with respect to three of the rights 
surveyed above: the rights to lend, to resell, and to use media on their device 
of choice. Second, we asked how much more, if anything, respondents would 
be willing to pay for media goods that conferred those rights. Finally, we asked 
whether the absence of those rights would make respondents more likely to 
acquire digital media through other avenues. In order to ensure that respondents 
were engaged and that we were closely replicating a real-world shopping 
experience, we first gave them a choice between several popular media titles. 
 
131 See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed 
Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 664 (1996) (explaining that 
informed minorities are rare and that, where they do exist, they fail to solve imperfect information 
problems in the market). 
132 Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingell, 
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983) 
[hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on Deception] (“A ‘material’ misrepresentation or practice is 
one which is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct regarding a product.”), reprinted in In 
re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 182 (1984). 
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1. Consumer Preferences for Rights 
On the whole, respondents expressed a preference for lending, reselling, 
and using media on their device of choice. Across media types and notice 
conditions, 55% reported a moderate or strong preference for media they can 
lend, 39% preferred media they can resell, and 85% preferred media compatible 
with their device of choice. A number of respondents used the open-ended 
questions to express these preferences without being prompted. When asked 
what the short notice meant to them, they offered comments like the following: 
“It means I need to leave this site and go somewhere else that doesn’t try to 
restrict me from doing what I want with something I pay for.” “It means that I 
can read the book but I cannot resell or lend it. This is information I like to 
have, and I was glad to see it so prominently displayed.” “I probably won’t buy. 
If I don’t own it when I buy it, I may as well buy the CD.” 
We measured each respondent’s overall preference by combining these 
three questions into a single variable, the Preference Thermometer. We 
calculated that variable by assigning a value of +2 for each strong preference, 
+1 for each moderate preference, 0 for no preference, -1 for each moderate 
dispreference, and -2 for each strong dispreference. Respondents who strongly 
preferred media goods they could not lend, resell, or use on their device of 
choice scored -6; ones who strongly preferred each of those rights scored 6. 
The distribution of the Preference Thermometer is represented below in 
Figure 17. The median score was 3, and the mean was 2.8. 
  
Figure 17: Percentage Distribution of Preference Thermometer 
The overwhelming majority of respondents expressed some preference for the rights to lend, 
resell, or use on their device of choice. Nearly 40% expressed a strong preference. 
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When we compared respondents who viewed digital and tangible goods, 
we observed a remarkable consistency in their preferences. As Figure 18 
illustrates, the rate at which respondents preferred lending, reselling, and 
using their device of choice was stable across media types, regardless of 
whether the media was tangible or digital. These patterns repeated for both 
the License Now and short notice conditions.133 
 
 
Figure 18: Percentage of “Buy Now” Respondents Who Prefer Rights 
 
Respondent preferences were strongly correlated with the frequency of 
online shopping for media and the lending and reselling of physical media. 
Respondents who regularly engaged in these activities were more likely to 
score highly on the Preference Thermometer. We also saw a difference 
between men and women, with men being considerably more likely to have 
strong preferences for greater rights. 
 
133 License Now respondents expressed the following preferences: lending, 54%; reselling, 34%; 
and device of choice, 85%. For the short notice, preferences were slightly higher: lending, 58%; 
reselling, 41%; and device of choice, 88%. These preferences did not vary significantly between media 
type in either case. 
Our open-ended questions offer additional support for this observation. When asked, “If you 
own the [media good] you paid for, what sort of uses can you make of it?”, the number of respondents 
who said they could engage in a range of activities—including lending, giving away, reselling, 
consuming, and making personal uses—was consistent across notice conditions and media types. 
Respondents expressed consistent preferences for lending, reselling, and using their device 
of choice across media types. 
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2. Willingness to Pay for Rights 
Next we asked respondents to assign a dollar value to their preferences. 
Since respondents were not spending actual money to acquire these rights, 
we were deliberately conservative in our design of these questions. First, we 
presented respondents with the current price of the good on Amazon and 
asked how much more they would pay for the product if it came with a 
particular right. In doing so, we allowed for the possibility that some 
respondents may value rights but be unwilling to pay anything extra for them 
on the grounds that traditional ownership rights should already be reflected 
in the current price. And, in fact, many respondents who expressed strong 
preferences for rights were unwilling to pay more for them.134 Second, by 
asking how much more respondents would pay for these rights as opposed to 
how much less they would pay if the good came without them, we hoped to 
avoid the influence of the endowment effect—the well-established tendency 
to overvalue objects or rights that we own.135 Finally, to discourage outliers, 
we capped responses to these questions at $20. 
Most digital consumers, 54%, were willing to pay more for at least one of 
these three rights.136 The median overall price increase was $1, but the average 
was $9.60 above the current Amazon prices. For the individual rights, 
respondents were willing to pay an average of $3.54 more for the right to lend, 
$3.06 for the right to resell, and $2.99 for the right to use media on their 
device of choice. Taken together, this evidence suggests that rights associated 
with personal property ownership influence the price of digital media goods. 
More than half of our respondents were willing to pay more for those rights. 
Among those who were unwilling to pay more, it is fair to conclude that many 
expect those rights to be part of the bargain under existing prices. 
3. Likelihood of Switching to Subscriptions and File Sharing 
Finally, we were curious if the rights to lend, resell, and use the device of 
choice influenced consumer decisionmaking about where and how to acquire 
media. Recent years have seen declining physical and digital sales and a 
 
134 For lending, 46% of respondents who expressed a strong preference for that right were 
unwilling to pay more. For resale, that number was 45%, and for device of choice it was 60%. 
135 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1342 (1990) (discussing how everyday objects increase in value as 
soon as they become one’s possessions); Carey K. Morewedge et al., Bad Riddance or Good Rubbish? 
Ownership and Not Loss Aversion Causes the Endowment Effect, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
947, 949 (2009) (reporting that brokers who owned mugs themselves “bought and sold mugs for 
their clients at a higher price than did brokers who did not own a mug”). 
136 Fifty-three percent of respondents gave a greater-than-zero answer to at least one of the 
three questions. 
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corresponding increase in subscription streaming in the music and movie 
industries.137 Since sales are typically more profitable for rights holders and 
creators than streaming services, if the absence of property rights steers 
consumers towards streaming, copyright holders may be inclined to rethink 
their licensing terms. That should hold doubly true for infringing downloads. 
If the absence of meaningful rights in digital purchases encourages would-be 
paying customers to get their content from The Pirate Bay rather than Apple 
or Amazon, rights holders should take a hard look a their digital “sales” strategy. 
We asked respondents if they had used or were familiar with subscription 
streaming services. An overwhelming majority, 94%, answered yes. Of that 
group, we asked if they would be more likely to watch a movie, listen to a 
record, or read a book through a subscription service like Netflix, Spotify, or 
Kindle Unlimited if they could not acquire a version of the good that allowed 
lending, rental, or the use of their preferred device. Overall, 52% were more 
likely to stream if they could not lend.138 
That rate held steady across the four notice conditions, but was consistently 
higher for movies. For resale, 43% of respondents were more likely to stream. 
Again, that number held steady across notice conditions, but saw a spike for 
movies.139 The ability to use the consumer’s device of choice elicited the 
highest response rate, with 63% stating an increased likelihood of using a 
streaming service overall; that figure jumped to 74% among movie shoppers.140 
We asked a similar set of questions to the 42% of respondents who 
indicated familiarity with BitTorrent, a protocol for distributed file sharing,141 
and The Pirate Bay, a popular index of copyrighted material available online at 
no charge.142 Although BitTorrent is frequently used for non-infringing 
purposes, and even some users of The Pirate Bay are engaged in non-infringing 
uses, much of the traffic associated with these two services constitutes 
infringement. Based on our survey data, consumers are more likely to opt out 
of lawful markets for copyrighted works and download illegally if there is no 
 
137 See Derek Thompson, The Death of Music Sales, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.the
atlantic.com/business/achive/2015/01/buying-music-is-so-over/384790/ [http://perma.cc/D8QZ-34ED] 
(describing the decline in sales of CDs and digital music); Andrew Wallenstein, Why 2015 Home 
Entertainment Figures Should Worry Studios, VARIETY (Jan. 6, 2016, 10:58 AM), http://variety.com/2016/
digital/news/home-entertainment-spending-2015-studios-1201673329/ [http://perma.cc/xw8Z-H898] 
(noting that “subscription streaming increased by a whopping 25%” in both 2014 and 2015). 
138 For books, 48% were more likely to stream; for music, 47%; and for movies, 61%. 
139 For movies, 54% were more likely to stream; for books, 40%; and for music, 36%. 
140 For both books and music, 57% reported an increased likelihood of streaming. 
141 See About BitTorrent, BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/company/about [https://perma.
cc/XXF5-LTYM] (explaining that BitTorrent’s protocols “keep creators and consumers in control of 
their content and data” and “move as much as 40% of the world’s Internet traffic on a daily basis”). 
142 See About, PIRATE BAY, https://thepiratebay.org/about [https://perma.cc/CE36-KCHS] (describing 
the website as “the worlds [sic] largest bittorrent indexer,” which is available for use “free of charge”). 
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lawful way to obtain the rights to lend, resell, and use those copies on their 
device of choice. Thirty-two percent of respondents were more likely to 
download files without paying in the absence of a right to lend; 31% were 
more likely to do so in the absence of a right to resell; and 40% in the absence 
of a right to use their device of choice.143 
Not surprisingly, we observed a correlation between the strength of 
respondents’ preferences for these rights and the likelihood that they would 
subscribe to a streaming service or download illegally in the absence of those 
rights. Perhaps more troublingly for rights holders and retailers, we also 
observed a strong correlation between the frequency of online media 
acquisition and both of these alternative avenues. Those who shop online for 
media either frequently or very frequently were considerably more likely to 
switch to subscription streaming or illegal downloads. 
The MediaShop study establishes that a sizable number of digital media 
consumers misunderstand the rights they acquire when they Buy Now. Those 
misperceptions are in large part a function of the ubiquitous use of language 
borrowed from familiar transactions involving tangible goods, but our study 
strongly suggests that those misperceptions can be corrected through clear 
and conspicuous short notices. Finally, the study supports the conclusion that 
the rights to lend, resell, and use media goods on a consumer’s device of 
choice are important to consumers’ purchasing decisions. In the next Section, 
we consider the legal implications of these empirical findings. 
IV. FALSE AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 
For the market to function efficiently, the public needs to be able to rely on 
the claims of manufacturers and retailers about the products and services they 
offer. Putting the burden on consumers to independently investigate every claim 
 
143 In recent months, we have seen some indirect evidence of this phenomenon. When Kanye 
West released his latest album, The Life of Pablo, as an exclusive on Tidal, a streaming service, he 
announced, “My album will never never never be on Apple. And it will never be for sale . . . . You 
can only get it on Tidal.” Kanye West (@kanyewest), TWITTER (Feb. 15, 2016, 6:34 PM), https://
twitter.com/kanyewest/status/699376240709402624 [https://perma.cc/4GW5-LGJE]. A day later, 
the album passed half a million downloads by BitTorrent users alone. Nathan McAlone, Kanye West’s 
New Album Has Already Gone Pirate ‘Gold’ with 500,000 Illegal Downloads in a Single Day, BUS. INSIDER: 
TECH INSIDER (Feb. 16, 2016, 12:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kanye-wests-album-went-
gold-with-500000-downloads-in-just-24-hours-if-were-talking-about-illegal-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/
2G8R-72PU]. West soon retreated from his emphatic position, but the album still has yet to see a 
physical release. See Peter Helman, Kanye West’s Updated The Life of Pablo Is Now on Apple Music 
and Spotify, STEREOGUM (Mar. 30, 2016, 10:06 PM), http://www.stereogum.com/1868554/kanye-
wests-updated-the-life-of-pablo-will-reportedly-be-on-apple-music-and-spotify-this-friday/news [https://
perma.cc/L4N9-6F5M] (announcing that two of the album’s tracks were available on streaming services 
other than Tidal and that the rest of the album was expected to follow that week). 
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about price, quality, performance, and other central characteristics introduces 
massive information costs. It also leaves consumers vulnerable to abuse. 
Although precise information about the digital revenues of retailers like 
Apple and Amazon is hard to come by, publicly available data suggest that 
deception in this space costs consumers billions of dollars a year. Apple’s 
revenue in fiscal year 2015 totaled more than $233 billion.144 Of that amount, 
8.8%, or $18.7 billion, was attributable to its services division, which includes 
the iTunes Store, the App Store, the Mac App Store, the iBooks Store, 
AppleCare, Apple Pay, and other services.145 Amazon brought in $107 billion 
in revenue in 2015,146 an estimated $7.9 billion of which can be traced to digital 
content.147 Estimating conservatively, if the deceptive Buy Now button is 
responsible for just 10% of the price of digital goods, consumer deception 
results in as much as $2.5 billion in overpayments to these two retailers alone 
every year. And that figure ignores any indirect revenue the illusion of 
ownership contributes to sales of related hardware, like iPhones and Kindles. 
Putting the magnitude of damages aside, marketing language that 
misleads consumers about the nature of goods or services can trigger liability 
under both state and federal law. In this Section, we outline those legal theories, 
their application to the Buy Now button, and their limitations.148 Ultimately, 
we conclude that although private causes of action offer consumers a promising 
 
144 See Apple’s Global Revenue from 1st Quarter 2005 to 3rd Quarter 2016 (In Billion U.S. Dollars), 
STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/263426/apples-global-revenue-since-1st-quarter-2005 [https:
//perma.cc/AG46-MJ9A] (tracking Apple’s quarterly revenues from 2005 to 2016). 
145 See Share of Apple’s Revenue by Product Category from the First Quarter of 2012 to the Second 
Quarter of 2016, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/382260/segments-share-revenue-of-apple 
[https://perma.cc/4MQH-39GC] (reporting the share of Apple’s quarterly revenues in 2015 coming 
from its “Services” as 6.43%, 8.61%, 10.14%, and 9.88%, for an average of 8.8%). 
146 See Press Release, Amazon.com, Amazon.com Announces Fourth Quarter Sales Up 22% to 
$35.7 Billion (Jan. 28, 2016), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NjA3O
TE1fENoaWxkSUQ9MzIxMDI4fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1 [https://perma.cc/N6D6-Z6QE] (reporting 
that “[n]et sales increased 20% to $107.0 billion” in 2015). 
147 See Mark Hoelzel & Emily Adler, The Kindle Fire Is Giving a Big Boost to Amazon’s Revenues 
from Digital Media, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 26, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/a-look-
at-amazons-kindle-ecosystem-4-2014-2 [https://perma.cc/DRT6-B7KN] (showing graphically the 
revenue that the Amazon Kindle brought in from digital media). 
148 We limit our discussion to applicable United States law. However, European consumer 
protection law may very well provide a parallel avenue for enforcement. Although no cases sounding in 
false or deceptive advertising have been brought yet, cases in Germany and France have challenged 
restrictions on consumers’ ability to resell digital video games on contract grounds. See Jon Fingas, Lawsuit 
Demands the Right to Resell Steam Games, ENGADGET (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/12/21
/lawsuit-demands-steam-resales [https://perma.cc/NV65-PDVM] (announcing that a French consumer 
group was suing a company for the right to resell its downloadable games); Jeffrey Matulef, Court Favours 
Valve in Not Allowing Digital Content Resells, EUROGAMER.NET (July 2, 2014), http://www.eurogamer.
net/articles/2014-02-07-court-favours-valve-in-not-allowing-digital-content-resells [https://perma.cc/2U9Y
-S23S] (reporting that “[t]he Regional Court of Berlin decision ha[d] dismissed” a consumer group’s 
lawsuit contesting a company’s EULA that forbade reselling digital content). 
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avenue for increasing the quality of information about digital goods, public 
regulatory enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission is likely necessary 
to fully address the concerns that our study reveals. 
A. State Claims 
All states have their own Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices 
(UDAP) statutes, sometimes referred to as “little FTC acts.”149 In addition, 
many states have both common law and statutory protections in place against 
false advertising. The result is a web of overlapping regimes to address unfair 
and deceptive business practices. In California, for example, the Unfair 
Competition Law bans “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or 
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”150 In 
addition, the state’s False Advertising Law prohibits the publication in 
advertising of “any statement . . . which is untrue or misleading, and which is 
known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be 
untrue or misleading.”151 And its Consumer Legal Remedies Act identifies a 
list of twenty-seven “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices,” including “[r]epresenting that a transaction confers or 
involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve.”152 
Although the precise formulation of these prohibitions differs between 
states, they are generally satisfied by proof of a false or misleading statement 
about a product that is material to consumers. The results of the MediaShop 
study offer strong empirical support that Buy Now buttons are both misleading 
and material to consumers. Nonetheless, there are a number of legal and 
practical hurdles facing private plaintiffs alleging false or deceptive advertising. 
First, many online retailers include arbitration provisions in their terms 
of use that purport to deny consumers the ability to seek redress in court. 
While not all major retailers rely on arbitration clauses,153 many powerhouse 
online retailers do. For example, Amazon includes the following language in 
its terms of use: 
 
149 For a high-level summary of these laws, see generally CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER 
LAW CTR., A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES (2009), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WP3-2N6H], 
which evaluates the effectiveness of various state UDAP statutes in providing protection for consumers. 
150 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2016). 
151 Id. § 17500. 
152 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2016). 
153 Notably, Apple does not include such terms in its iTunes agreement. See Apple Media 
Services Terms and Conditions, supra note 14 (preserving the ability of consumers to file suit given its 
lack of a binding arbitration clause). 
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Any dispute or claim relating in any way to your use of any Amazon Service, or 
to any products or services sold or distributed by Amazon or through 
Amazon.com will be resolved by binding arbitration, rather than in court, except 
that you may assert claims in small claims court if your claims qualify . . . . 
We each agree that any dispute resolution proceedings will be conducted only on 
an individual basis and not in a class, consolidated, or representative action . . . .154 
California courts have pushed back against sweeping arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts by deeming them unconscionable.155 However, the 
Supreme Court held that such an application of state contract law stands as an 
obstacle to the policies Congress meant to implement in the Federal 
Arbitration Act.156 And just last year, the Court held that lower courts cannot 
invalidate class arbitration clauses on the basis of costs that exceed plaintiffs’ 
likely recovery.157 Those five-justice majority opinions—both authored by 
Justice Scalia—prompted vigorous dissents and may well be revisited in a 
future term.158 
As the law stands, arbitration clauses can still be invalidated “upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”159 So 
arguments rooted in fraud, duress, or unconscionability unrelated to arbitration 
provisions are still available to consumer plaintiffs seeking to bypass 
arbitration. But one recent false advertising claim brought against Amazon was 
removed from federal court by virtue of the Amazon arbitration provision.160 
 
154 Conditions of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/?node
Id=508088 [https://perma.cc/PK9Y-7AS5] (last updated June 21, 2016). 
155 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding that class action 
waivers are unconscionable when “found in a consumer contract of adhesion . . . involv[ing] small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has 
. . . deliberately cheat[ed] large numbers of consumers . . . to the extent the obligation is governed 
by California law.”); see also Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 983-84 
(9th Cir. 2007) (finding the defendant’s “class arbitration clause . . . both procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable” and thus unenforceable). 
156 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (“A federal statute’s saving 
clause ‘cannot in reason be construed as [allowing] a common law right, the continued existence of 
which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act . . . . [T]he act cannot be held 
to destroy itself.’” (alteration in original)). 
157 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (rejecting respondents’ 
argument that individual litigation of their claims would violate antitrust policy, holding that “the 
antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim”). 
158 See generally Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 357 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
159 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
160 See Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., 141 F.Supp. 3d 1051, 1073-74 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (submitting 
plaintiffs’ claims to arbitration on the grounds that Amazon’s arbitration clause was neither illusory 
nor unconscionable). 
2017] What We Buy When We Buy Now 365 
More promisingly, arbitration clauses are ineffective when no agreement 
has been formed. Two recent cases—one from the California Court of 
Appeal161 and another from the Seventh Circuit162—illustrate the growing 
sensitivity of courts to the implications of automatic contract formation 
coupled with arbitration clauses that deny consumers effective legal redress. In 
both cases, the courts held that where an arbitration clause is “buried”163 in 
terms of service that are linked to or referenced on a page the consumer visits, 
but not directly presented in a manner that “get[s] the message through” that 
the consumer is agreeing to an arbitration agreement, 164 those terms “are not 
sufficiently conspicuous”165 to form the basis of an enforceable agreement. 
More recently, the Second Circuit questioned the enforceability of 
Amazon’s own arbitration clause after the plaintiff in a putative class action 
alleging violations of the Consumer Product Safety Act argued that notice of 
the terms was insufficient.166 As the court explained, Amazon customers were 
“not required to click an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms 
and conditions”; instead they were “asked to click on a ‘Place your order’ 
button after being told elsewhere on the page that ‘By placing your order, you 
agree to Amazon.com’s privacy notice and conditions of use,’ with the latter 
phrase hyperlinked to the [Amazon] Conditions of Use.’”167 If courts follow 
this line of reasoning, arbitration provisions buried in hyperlinked terms of 
service may function more like speed bumps rather than true barriers to 
individual and class action lawsuits. 
Even if consumers can avoid arbitration, because of the small recovery due 
to any individual plaintiff, Buy Now false advertising cases are probably viable 
only to the extent they can leverage the class action mechanism.168 For a class 
to be certified, a court must be convinced that the suit satisfies a number of 
requirements. The class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable.”169 With millions of potential class members, this requirement is 
 
161 See Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 123-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) 
(holding that users did not assent to the terms contained in hyperlinked terms of use agreement because 
the hyperlink failed to put “a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract”). 
162 See Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging 
that contracts formed on the Internet require a fact-intensive inquiry into “whether the 
circumstances support the assumption that the purchaser receives reasonable notice of [the terms 
and conditions of the agreement]”). 
163 Id. at 1033. 
164 Id. at 1036. 
165 Long, 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 123. 
166 See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 15-423-CV, 2016 WL 4473225, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 
2016) (holding that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff ’s claim on the basis of Amazon’s 
arbitration clause). 
167 Id. at *9. 
168 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
169 Id. 23(a)(1). 
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easily satisfied. Next, there must be “questions of law or fact common to the 
class.”170 Typically, this requires only a single common significant question of 
fact or law.171 Since the impact of the same Buy Now button—language all 
consumers encountered—is at issue for each class member, the commonality 
requirement can be satisfied.172 Potentially more problematic, however, is the 
requirement of predominance—that the questions common among class 
members predominate over questions that affect individual class members. 
Given the substantive differences between state laws, it may be difficult to 
certify a national class in a Buy Now case.173 Some state statutes include scienter 
requirements;174 others do not.175 Some states require a showing of reliance;176 
others do not.177 Available remedies also vary between states.178 
Although there are considerable hurdles facing private plaintiffs, there is 
good reason to suspect that state-wide class actions could succeed, particularly 
in the absence of an arbitration clause. But even if individual plaintiffs could 
recover, a more uniform solution may be preferable given the national and 
indeed international scope of markets for digital goods. 
B. Federal Claims 
There are two available avenues for federal claims concerning the Buy Now 
button: the Lanham Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Neither 
provides remedies for individual consumers, but the FTC Act may nonetheless 
provide policy tools to address misleading advertising in digital sales. 
1. The Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act is best known as the source of federal trademark protection. 
But it also prohibits the use of “any . . . false or misleading description of fact . . . in 
 
170 Id. 23(a)(2). 
171 See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that 
the question of whether a car manufacturer had a duty to disclose certain facts was common to the 
whole class of consumers even though different customers had viewed different advertisements). 
172 See Cabral v. Supple LLC, 608 F. App’x. 482, 483 (9th Cir. 2015) (vacating a class 
certification on the grounds that not all class members saw the same allegedly false advertisement). 
173 See Mazza, 666 F.3d at 594 (refusing to certify a national false advertising class because 
“each class member’s . . . claim should be governed by the . . . laws of the jurisdiction in which the 
transaction [in question] took place”). 
174 See CARTER, supra note 149, at 17 (explaining that while “[m]ost states do not require the 
state agency to prove the business’s intent or knowledge,” Colorado, Indiana, Nevada, North Dakota, 
and Wyoming do under certain circumstances). 
175 Id. 
176 See id. at 20 (“Some states require the consumer to show . . . that the consumer specifically 
relied on the [unfair or deceptive] practice.”). 
177 Id. 
178 See id. at 7-10 (offering a comparison of the remedies available to consumers in all fifty states). 
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commercial advertising or promotion [that] misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” of goods or services.179 On its face, 
the statute creates broad standing for private claims challenging false advertising. 
It allows “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged 
by such act” to sue for damages.180 While this language would suggest that 
the Lanham Act is a viable vehicle for consumer claims, courts have limited 
standing to competitors or others with a commercial interest implicated by 
the allegedly false statements.181 Consumers, even though they are most 
directly harmed by false claims about the products they buy, are barred from 
challenging them under the Lanham Act.182 
Concerned about “a veritable flood of claims brought in already overtaxed 
federal district courts,”183 courts argue that competitors are in a better 
position to vindicate consumer interests than consumers themselves.184 
Competitors, these courts reason, have greater resources and financial 
incentives to target false advertising, so we should expect them to vigorously 
pursue such claims. 
 
179 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). Courts interpreted section 43(a) as creating a claim for false 
advertising. See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising 
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1309-13 (2011) (offering a brief discussion of early false advertising cases 
under the Lanham Act). Although not all courts were quick to reach that conclusion, they eventually 
reached something approaching a consensus. With the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Congress 
codified the prevailing judicial reading, dividing section 43(a) into two subsections. The first 
establishes liability for the infringement of unregistered marks and trade dress. The second creates 
claims for false advertising and product disparagement. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (1988) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012)). 
180 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
181 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391-93 (2014) 
(considering the approaches of various circuit courts and concluding that “a plaintiff suing under 
§ 1125(a) ordinarily must show economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the deception 
wrought by the defendant’s advertising; and that that occurs when deception of consumers causes 
them to withhold trade from the plaintiff. That showing is generally not made when the deception 
produces injuries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the plaintiff”). 
182 See id. at 1390 (explaining that “[a] consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a 
disappointing product may well have an injury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot invoke 
the protection of the Lanham Act—a conclusion reached by every Circuit to consider the question”). 
183 Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971). Courts have 
expressed similar concerns for well over a century. See, e.g., N.Y. & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 
44 F. 277, 278 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1890) (warning against “open[ing] a Pandora’s box of vexatious litigation”). 
184 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[C]ompetitors 
have the greatest interest in stopping misleading advertising, and . . . section 43(a) allows those 
parties with the greatest interest in enforcement, and in many situations with the greatest resources 
to devote to a lawsuit, to enforce the statute rigorously.”); Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 
720 F. Supp. 194, 212 (D.D.C. 1989) (“While the Act is not directly available to consumers, it is 
nevertheless designed to protect consumers, by giving the cause of action to competitors who are 
prepared to vindicate the injury caused to consumers.” (citation omitted)), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 
913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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Sometimes that is true, but not always. Companies make the expensive 
decision to litigate only if they think it will give them a competitive advantage. 
If the Buy Now button leads to increased revenue compared to alternatives, 
competitors—even if they know the language is misleading—face strong 
incentives to use it. If consumers remain unaware of the deception, there is 
little competitive upside to pioneering new marketing language. For retailers 
who already use the standard language, a challenge could open them up to 
potential legal liability or public criticism for their past use of it. Also, new 
entrants into the concentrated digital media market may question how much 
their bottom lines will benefit from even a successful suit. 
Of course, there are reasons to suspect individuals would be reluctant to 
challenge false advertising too. Aside from the most expensive purchases, the 
harm to a single person caused by a false ad is just too small to justify the 
time and expense of a lawsuit. Class actions could solve that problem by 
bundling together the claims of similarly situated consumers in a single case, 
but without standing, that option remains off the table as a matter of federal 
false advertising law. 
2. The Federal Trade Commission Act 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is empowered by Congress through 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) to prevent the use of “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”185 Unfairness and 
deception are separate legal theories under which plaintiffs can allege a violation 
of the FTCA. Given the vagueness of Congress’s statutory mandate, the FTC 
released two policy statements in the 1980s to define the contours of deception 
and unfairness: the FTC Policy Statement on Deception186 and the FTC Policy 
Statement on Unfairness.187 The Policy Statement on Deception sets forth three 
key elements of a deception case: there must be (1) “a representation, omission, 
or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer”; (2) the interpretation of that 
act or practice is examined based on the perspective of a reasonable consumer; 
and (3) “the representation, omission, or practice must be ‘material.’”188 
 
185 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
186 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132, at app. at 174-84 (outlining the 
FTC’s “enforcement policy against deceptive acts or practices”). 
187 See Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n et al., to Wendell H. 
Ford, Chairman, Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. & John C. Danforth, 
Ranking Minority Member, Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. (Dec. 17, 
1980), reprinted in Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 app. at 1070-76 (1984) [hereinafter FTC Policy 
Statement on Unfairness] (outlining the FTC’s approach to “the concept of consumer unfairness”). 
188 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132, at app. at 175. 
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Under the FTC’s policy and case law, the Buy Now button and alternatives 
we tested would qualify as representations to the consumer.189 Our study 
speaks to the more nuanced problems of the representation’s propensity to 
mislead a “reasonable” consumer and the representation’s materiality. A 1983 
FTC policy statement imposes a “reasonable consumer” standard, and, over 
time, the agency has established criteria for evaluating whether a representation 
is misleading to the “reasonable” consumer.190 The FTC weighs the clarity of 
the representation, whether there is conspicuous information that qualifies 
the representation, and whether the representation has omitted important 
information.191 As one FTC official explained, 
A company’s marketing materials must be consistent with the nature of the 
product being offered. It’s not enough to disclose the information only in a 
fine print of a lengthy online user agreement . . . . [I]f your advertising giveth 
and your EULA [license agreement] taketh away don’t be surprised if the 
FTC comes calling.192 
In a series of investigations and enforcement actions over the past decade, 
the FTC has indicated that when retailers deprive consumers of the right to 
make reasonably expected use of digital media, those retailers may be engaged 
in deceptive behavior. In 2006, the FTC investigated Sony BMG for selling CDs 
that surreptitiously installed malicious software onto consumers’ computers.193 
Among the many ways this software harmed consumers, it prevented consumers 
from making copies of their CDs and only permitted them to transfer the data 
on their CDs to devices that used particular file formats—namely, secure 
Windows Media or Sony ATRAC files.194 Consumers who refused to install 
 
189 The FTC recently confirmed that a button characterizing a transaction constitutes a factual 
representation to consumers about the nature of that transaction. See Decision and Order at 3, Apple 
Inc., No. C-4444 (F.T.C. Mar. 25, 2014) (describing the FTC’s settlement with Apple over the 
latter’s failure to disclose that a user’s approval of a single in-app purchase automatically authorized 
all other purchases made in the fifteen minutes following the initial authorization); see also Redacted 
Order Granting Amazon’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Granting the FTC’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 18, FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 
2016) (concluding that Amazon’s use of buttons labeled “Free,” which automatically authorized 
future in-app purchases, was deceptive). 
190 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132, at app. at 178; see also 
HOOFNAGLE, supra note 122, at 125-28 (describing the FTC’s attempt “to ground the Commission’s 
analysis in reasonable interpretations of a practice”). 
191 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132, at app. at 175 n.4. 
192 Bruce Schneier, Do You Know Where Your Data Are?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2009, 11:59 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123997522418329223 [https://perma.cc/(8)8-KM58]. 
193 See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the Disaster: 
Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1211 (2007) (describing 
the FTC’s “response to the flawed notice and consent provisions of Sony BMG’s DRM”). 
194 See id. at 1166-77 (discussing how the software created several security vulnerabilities and 
improperly collected data). 
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the software could not play the CDs on their computers altogether. In its order, 
the Commission required Sony BMG to provide clear and prominent pre-
purchase notice to consumers of these unexpected restrictions.195 
After the Sony BMG incident, the FTC opened three section five 
investigations in response to threats by other digital media retailers to 
deactivate the servers necessary for consumers to authorize playback devices. 
If those servers had been deactivated, consumers would have been unable to 
transfer and play their digital media purchases on a new computer or device. 
But the three retailers that were investigated—Microsoft,196 Walmart, 197 and 
Major League Baseball198—all backed down from their publicly announced 
plans in the face of FTC scrutiny.199 As the Commission explained, it has a 
duty to ensure, 
In the context of sales of digital products, that consumers are provided 
sufficient information prior to purchase so that they understand any inherent 
 
195 See Decision and Order at 3-5, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, No. C-4195 (F.T.C. June 
28, 2007) (laying out the various disclosures Sony was required to make). 
196 See Letter from Mary Koelbel Engle, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Charles E. 
Buffon, Covington & Burling LLP (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/closing_letters/microsoft-corporation-msn-music/080930msnmusicclosingletter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZA3Y-7P45] [hereinafter FTC Opinion Letter to Microsoft] (closing the FTC 
investigations into Microsoft’s threatened actions). 
197 See Letter from Mary Koelbel Engle, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to M. Sean Royall, 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (June 23, 2010), https://ww.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documentsclosing-
letters/wal-mart-stores-inc./100623walmartletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZCB-6Q47] [hereinafter FTC Opinion 
Letter to Walmart] (explaining that the FTC would not be recommending enforcement action). 
198 See Letter from Mary Koelbel Engle, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Randal M. 
Shaheen, Arnold & Porter LLP (Oct. 9, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
closing_letters/mlb-advanced-media-l.p./081009mlbamclosingletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/B69Y-K9Q7] 
[hereinafter FTC Opinion Letter to MLB] (declining to recommend enforcement action). 
199 See FTC Opinion Letter to Microsoft, supra note 196, at 2 (noting that “[i]n June 2008, 
. . . Microsoft announced that it had reversed its decision”); FTC Opinion Letter to MLB, supra note 
198, at 3 (discussing the “MLBAM’s discontinuation of [certain] advertising” and the “accommodations 
that MLBAM [was] making to its customers” who were affected by DRM limits); FTC Opinion Letter 
to Walmart, supra note 197, at 2 (noting that Walmart “had reversed its decision to shut down the 
DRM servers”). The tension between consumer expectations of ownership and actual technological 
capabilities extends beyond digital media to a range of so-called “smart” devices. In 2016, the FTC 
launched an investigation into Nest’s decision to remotely disable the Revolv, a $300 home 
automation hub sold to consumers. The Commission “was concerned that reasonable consumers 
would not expect the Revolv hubs to become unusable due to Revolv Inc.’s actions, and that 
unilaterally rendering the devices inoperable would cause unjustified, substantial consumer injury 
that consumers themselves could not reasonably avoid.” Letter from Mary Koelbel Engle, Assoc. 
Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Richard J. Lutton, Head of Legal & Regulatory Affairs, Nest Labs, 
Inc. 2 (July 7, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/closing-letters/nid/160707nestrevo
lveletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TXV-BGFH] [hereinafter FTC Opinion Letter to Nest Labs]. 
After Nest committed to providing consumers full refunds, the FTC closed its investigation. See id. 
(explaining that, due in part to “Nest’s practice of providing full refunds,” the FTC had concluded 
that “no further action [was] warranted”). 
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limitations on the use of the product they buy . . . . Boilerplate disclosures in 
lengthy Terms & Conditions or End User License Agreements may be 
insufficient to apprise consumers of important limitations on their purchases, 
particularly if the limitations may lead to an inability to view or listen to 
content in the future.200 
In its investigation into Major League Baseball’s public threat to disable 
its servers, the Commission appeared particularly concerned by MLB’s prior 
representations “that consumers would ‘own’ the Downloads.”201 MLB 
marketing materials stressed that consumers would “OWN complete game 
downloads from this year or yesteryear” and encouraged consumers to “[o]wn 
today’s games and yesterday’s classics.”202 The FTC argued that such claims 
could “cause reasonable consumers to believe that they had the ability to play 
the content on a potentially unlimited number of compatible devices, or could 
otherwise use and dispose of the copy consistent with how consumers can use 
and dispose of other copies of copyrighted works that they own.”203 
Although we share the FTC’s worry, we note that the Commission did not 
appear to use survey data to determine what inferences a reasonable consumer 
might draw from claims of ownership. In contrast, the FTC has relied on 
survey evidence to assess misleadingness, accepting varying levels of proof to 
establish deception.204 Today, if the FTC finds that a practice misleads a 
“significant minority”—ten or fifteen percent—of customers, 205 the practice is 
deceptive.206 The willingness of courts to find deception in light of this relatively 
low incidence of misleadingness implicitly acknowledges that advertisements are 
 
200 See FTC Opinion Letter to MLB, supra note 198, at 2-3 (internal quotations omitted). 
201 Id. at 2. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 3. 
204 While historically the FTC found deception even when less than ten percent of consumers 
were misled, over time the Commission began to look for higher percentages of deceived consumers. 
See Ivan L. Preston & Jef I. Richards, Consumer Miscomprehension as a Challenge to FTC Prosecutions 
of Deceptive Advertising, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605, 610-13 (1986) (noting that after some “early 
cases . . . the percentage supporting findings of violations became typically higher”). 
205 See POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 777 F.3d 478, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The Commission 
‘examines the overall net impression’ left by an ad, and considers whether ‘at least a significant 
minority of reasonable consumers’ would ‘likely’ interpret the ad to assert the claim.” (internal 
citations omitted)); see also Telebrands Corp. v. FTC, 457 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that a 
company seriously and deliberately misled consumers with its “expensive, nationwide . . . [and] highly 
successful” advertising campaign). 
206 See Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 
F.3d 578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e believe that survey evidence demonstrating that 15% of the respondents 
were misled . . . is sufficient to establish . . . [a] claim for false or misleading advertising . . . .”); Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (affirming the FTC’s finding of 
deception when an ad “misled 15% (or 10%) of the buying public”); Telebrands Corp. v. Media Grp., 
Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1342, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a survey showing that 20% of 
consumers were misled was sufficient evidence to show deception). 
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often susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation—and where one of 
those interpretations is misleading, the advertiser is liable. This judicial 
tendency also reflects the fact that false advertising law is not intended to protect 
only the savvy or the skeptical, but also “that vast multitude which includes the 
ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.”207 
Once we know consumers are being misled, the question turns to whether 
or not those inaccuracies are material to their choices. Would they have 
behaved differently had they known the truth? Perhaps they would have 
refused to buy the product, would have only purchased it for a lower price, or 
would have preferred an alternative.208 Materiality can be presumed for 
claims the seller expressly states or intentionally conveys, as well as for claims 
relating to a product’s cost, central characteristics, purpose, performance, or 
health and safety. A strong argument can be made that the rights suggested 
by the Buy Now button are just as material: an ebook that you can keep forever 
is a very different product than one that can disappear without notice. 
Even if those rights are not presumptively material, the FTC determines 
the importance of claims by analyzing surveys, credible testimony of 
consumers, and whether the claim involves a feature that alters the price of the 
product. Here, our survey points to materiality in two respects—an expressed 
preference for the ability to use digital media in ways similar to physical books, 
music, and movies, and an expressed willingness to pay more for these features. 
The FTC does not require evidence that the consumers who are deceived 
are the same as the consumers to whom false or misleading claims are 
material. Yet, in most cases where deception and materiality are established, 
it is safe to assume that a substantial number of consumers are misled about 
claims that are material to them. Our data demonstrate that with respect to 
the Buy Now button, this assumption is well-founded. Many respondents who 
expressed misperceptions about their rights valued their rights highly. For 
example, of the 519 respondents with Rights Scores of 2 or less, more than 
40% expressed a strong preference for ownership rights. 
Having shown their propensity to mislead reasonable consumers in 
material respects, it is clear that the FTCA’s deception theory could be 
employed against the practices described in this Article. We now briefly turn 
to the FTC’s other main theory of liability: unfairness. Unfairness is a more 
controversial legal theory that has been pruned back by Congress after the 
Commission used it to police a series of powerful economic actors—companies 
 
207 Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944); see id. 
(upholding an FTC decision that a “rejuvenating” face cream was deceptively marketed, despite the 
manufacturer’s claim that “no straight-thinking person could believe that its cream would actually 
rejuvenate”); see also Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“The Act was not 
intended to protect ‘sophisticates.’”). 
208 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 132. 
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that advertised to kids, funeral parlor directors, and used car salesmen.209 Today, 
the FTC uses a three-prong test to establish unfairness. For a consumer injury 
to be unfair, it must be (1) substantial; (2) not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to competition or consumers produced by the practice; and (3) 
reasonably unavoidable.210 
Substantial injuries to consumers usually—but not always—involve 
monetary harm, coercion into the purchase of unwanted goods or services, 
and health or safety risks.211 Substantial injury may also occur where a 
business practice causes a small harm to a large number of people. Our data 
suggest that an unfairness theory would be based on this last factor: the idea 
that a large number of consumers suffer a financial detriment based upon 
receiving a different product—and one that came with significantly fewer 
rights—than they thought they would. 
If the FTC finds an injury to consumers, the unfairness test suggests that 
the FTC should weigh the injury against its potential benefits and also 
determine whether the consumer could have avoided the injury by shopping 
elsewhere. Here, a digital goods company could argue that communicating 
more nuanced information to consumers imposes significant costs that are 
avoided by simple disclosures such as Buy Now. But the low cost of 
implementing a short notice provision undercuts that assertion. Retailers might 
also argue that consumers could avoid the harm done to them by reverting to 
analog copies and avoiding the pitfalls of digital products altogether. But pointing 
to related products that do not leverage unfair practices is an unconvincing 
response to ongoing consumer harm, particularly since consumers are often 
unaware of the differences between digital and analog goods. 
The FTC could reasonably rely on either its deception or unfairness 
authority to pursue the use of Buy Now buttons. Between the two, deception 
appears to be the more natural fit, particularly because the unfairness theory 
raises potentially fact-intensive questions about the substantiality of the 
injury to consumers and the efficiency benefits of simple disclosures. Since 
unfairness offers no additional remedies, in all likelihood, if the FTC were to 
police these practices, it would proceed on a deception theory only. 
 
209 Cf. HOOFNAGLE, supra note 122, at 133 (discussing how “the FTC found that” practices of 
certain used car salesmen “violated clearly established public policy”). 
210 See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, supra note 187, app. at 1073 (describing the “three 
tests” that a practice must satisfy to be found unfair). 
211 See id. (describing the types of injuries the Commission typically considers substantial). 
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3. The FTC Policy Approach to Buy Now 
Like the Lanham Act, the FTCA lacks a private right of action.212 
Nonetheless, the FTC may be the best policy option for addressing the 
deficits between consumer perceptions and the realities of digital goods. 
Whereas competitors have incentives not to sue under the Lanham Act,213 the 
FTC has long intervened when entire markets engage in some deceptive 
practice. The FTC is empowered to sue, both to prevent this kind of 
widespread market deception214 and also to selectively enforce the law against 
a single company, even where competitors engage in the same practices.215 
Not only does the FTC have the power to address these activities, it has 
fact-finding and investigative authority that could further elucidate the 
problems in digital goods marketing.216 Companies, especially online ones, 
extensively test their websites and marketing representations to increase 
sales.217 The FTC’s broad investigative authorities could be used to obtain 
surveys or other internal-facing research performed by companies on 
consumers’ perceptions of Buy Now. 
Finally, the FTC’s processes could guide policy through two different 
mechanisms. First, the FTC’s enforcement actions are similar to a common 
law process. In the privacy realm, Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog 
have praised the FTC’s approach as an incrementalist, case-by-case approach 
to difficult consumer protection problems.218 The FTC, unburdened by the 
hurdles that face private plaintiffs and some of the pathologies of civil 
 
212 See, e.g., Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973) (“The protection 
against unfair trade practices afforded by the [FTCA] vests initial remedial power solely in the 
Federal Trade Commission.”). 
213 See Aaron Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 35-
36 (2010) (highlighting that when multiple competitors in an industry make a false claim, no 
company has an incentive to sue another and put a stop to the practice). 
214 See FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 US 483, 493 (1922) (“The fact that misrepresentation 
and misdescription have become so common in [the market] . . . does not prevent their use being 
an unfair method of competition.”). 
215 See Johnson Prods. Co. v. FTC, 549 F.2d 35, 41 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming the FTC’s authority 
to target a single firm based on an industry-wide practice); Ger-Ro-Mar, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 33, 35 
(2d Cir. 1975) (“[W]hile petitioners may be unfortunate in being the first target of the Commission 
with respect to the selling practices in question, the Commission is under no obligation to start 
simultaneous suits against all alleged offenders and it did not abuse its discretion in any sense . . . .”). 
216 See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority 
[https://perma.cc/XJ5K-5LSV] (explaining the FTC’s enforcement powers). 
217 See e.g., Jeff Oxford, 6 Things Online Retailers Can Learn from Amazon, FORBES (Sept. 24, 
2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2013/09/24/6-things-online-retailers-can-learn
-from-amazon/#3ae599553b85 [https://perma.cc/P8HG-HRKV] (noting that Amazon conducts tests 
on various facets of its website in order to increase sales). 
218 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 144 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 648-49 (2014) (discussing patterns of development in FTC privacy enforcement). 
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litigation, can set norms through carefully selected cases.219 These cases are, 
in turn, relied upon by corporate counsel to define the boundaries between 
responsible and irresponsible conduct.220 
Second, the FTC can shape policy through public workshops, a quasi-
legislative process which would provide the Commission with a way to police 
the sale of digital goods without resorting to litigation. Because the dominant 
firms are mainstream and reputable actors, the FTC could use such 
workshops to establish norms for the sale of digital goods while incorporating 
the views of the industry, consumers, and academic experts in marketing and 
economics. These perspectives could help the FTC fill the legislative gaps in 
many consumer protection issues that escape the attention of Congress. 
For these reasons, we think the FTC offers an attractive remedy to bridge 
the gulf between the realities of the digital marketplace and consumers’ 
perceptions. The FTC could bring the most relevant actors to the table to 
develop a more effective set of disclosures and rules. The FTC could then use 
its enforcement powers to police the digital media companies that continue 
to use misleading marketing methods. 
CONCLUSION 
In a recent article, Professor Lauren Willis argued that firms should be 
required to periodically demonstrate, through third-party testing, that their 
customers understand the material terms of transactions.221 Willis’s approach 
recognizes that consumer understanding changes over time and is sensitive 
to context. In that spirit, our study has revealed the degree to which 
consumers are misled by the use of marketing language like the Buy Now 
button that relies on expectations developed in the tangible goods economy, 
but which are incompatible with the restrictive license terms that are attached 
to most digital media transactions. We have argued that use of the Buy Now 
button in this context constitutes false and deceptive advertising. But we have 
 
219 See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 122, at 333-35 (noting that “the FTC now enforces on a case-by-
case basis” and elects to pursue enforcements “that are likely to have structural effect”). 
220 Among large, reputable firms like those that dominate the market for digital media goods, 
compliance with FTC norms is likely. See KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, 
PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
EUROPE 68-71 (2015) (describing the incentives created by the FTC’s enforcement authority, which 
encourage large companies to self-comply with FTC norms). However, among smaller firms, because 
of the extremely low risk of detection, the other priorities of startups, a lack of sophistication, and the 
fewer resources available for compliance, there is a greater risk of noncompliance. See Chris Jay 
Hoofnagle, US Regulatory Values and Privacy Consequences, Implications for the European Citizen, 2(2) 
EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 169 (2016). 
221 Lauren Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1371-72 (2015). 
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also outlined an effective alternative: a short notice that significantly 
improved respondents’ comprehension of their rights in digital goods. 
Those additional disclosures, which convey information to consumers that 
is currently buried in unread and unreadable license terms, could result in at 
least two positive developments.222 In the short term, we are confident a short 
notice like the one we designed would lead to consumers making more 
informed decisions about existing products and services in the marketplace. 
Once consumers know digital goods come with substantial restrictions, they 
may decide physical copies are worth the occasional inconvenience they 
impose. Or consumers may see subscription streaming services as a more 
attractive alternative. We might also see a shift in price reflecting those newly 
informed consumer preferences. 
In the long term, disclosure could spur competition between competing 
retailers over the bundles of rights they convey to consumers.223 Today, 
competition in the digital media market revolves around the most obvious 
and salient characteristic—namely, price. But by lowering the information 
costs associated with understanding the rights consumers acquire, short 
notices might create incentives to offer more attractive bundles of rights. 
Given the concentration of digital media markets and the ongoing control 
copyright holders exert over retailers, there is no guarantee that the market 
will respond to pressure from consumers for meaningful property rights in 
their digital purchases. But unless consumers have accurate information about 
those products, their preferences will remain a byproduct of deception. 
  
 
222 See Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, supra note 121, at 339 (describing the positive 
externalities associated with required disclosures, including helping people make better decisions 
and inducing enterprises to be more efficient). 
223 See Howard Beales et al., Information Remedies for Consumer Protection, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 
410, 410 (1981) (“Additional information induces sellers to compete for the patronage of informed 
consumers by offering better values.”). 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Basic Demographics of Survey Respondents 
 
Characteristic Category Percentage
Sex 
Male 49%
Female 51%
 
Age 
18–24 11%
25–34 18%
35–44 17%
45–54 19%
55–64 16%
65+ 18%
 
Income 
<$15,000 13%
$15–$25,000 12%
$25–$50,000 24%
$50–$75,000 17%
$75–$100,000 12%
$100–$150,000 12%
>$150,000 9%
 
Race 
White/Caucasian 80%
African American 9%
Hispanic 6%
Asian 4%
Other 1%
 
Education 
Level 
< High School 2%
High School/GED 22%
Some College 28%
2-Year Degree 11%
4-Year Degree 25%
Masters Degree 10%
Doctoral Degree 1%
Professional Degree 
(e.g., JD/MD)
1% 
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Table 2: Size of Test Groups 
Condition Books Music Movies Total 
Buy Digital 113 109 111 333 
License Now 101 107 102 310 
Buy Physical 110 107 112 329 
Short Notice 109 110 108 327 
Total 433 433 433 1,299 
Table 3: Percentage of Consumers Who Thought a Given Product Format and Notice Conveyed Rights 
Format Condition Own Keep Device Lend Gift Will Resell Copy
Digital Movie Buy Now 78 84 81 35 33 30 17 12
Digital Movie License Now 69 75 75 42 39 28 23 18
Digital Movie Short Notice 65 82 82 31 36 29 17 14
Ebook Buy Now 86 87 81 48 38 26 12 9
Ebook License Now 50 81 84 46 36 26 14 8
Ebook Short Notice 63 86 77 35 28 13 6 4
MP3 Buy Now 83 89 88 39 50 32 17 23
MP3 License Now 62 80 89 42 42 26 13 16
MP3 Short Notice 63 84 85 27 36 21 6 7
Blu-ray Buy Now 79 87 80 63 73 55 48 13
Paperback Buy Now 85 88 85 75 70 47 53 14
CD Buy Now 90 85 82 57 68 47 36 20
